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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

9th Circuit: Counterfeiting Claim Requires Court to Evaluate Likelihood of Confusion by Comparing Products as a Whole, Not Just Identical Marks. (Except When Maybe It Doesn’t.)

November 11, 2020

by Stefan Szpajda

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Does the Lanham Act require a plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion to prevail on a counterfeiting claim? And if so, should the court simply compare the marks at issue, or look beyond them to the products themselves and other marketplace factors bearing on likely confusion? In the Ninth Circuit at least, the answer to both of these questions is now a clear yes. Except, as discussed below, when it isn’t.

Summary

Although the Ninth Circuit has previously held that Section 1114 requires a likelihood of confusion for a trademark infringement claim, it had never expressly held that a counterfeiting claim requires such a showing. That changed when the appellate court issued its recent decision in Arcona v. Farmacy Beauty. The Ninth Circuit also held that even assuming the marks at issue are identical, there is no presumption of confusion if the products at issue are not identical, before adding in a footnote that there “may be times the mark itself is so strong in the marketplace” that an identical mark could be confusing even if the products are different.

Facts and Background

The facts and procedural posture are straightforward. Arcona, Inc. sued Farmacy Beauty for trademark infringement and related causes of action based on its rights in the registered trademark “EYE DEW” for skincare products. The district court granted summary judgment for Farmacy, finding that a reasonable consumer would not confuse Farmacy’s skincare product with Arcona’s because their respective packaging featured different shapes, design schemes, text, and colors as well as distinguishing house marks. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Lanham Act requires a likelihood of confusion based on a comparison of the products as a whole, and other marketplace factors such as third party use of the plaintiff’s mark, rather than confining the analysis to a comparison of the identical marks on their own.

Practice Points

Why does this decision matter? In short, the Lanham Act gives plaintiffs more leverage in trademark disputes when their allegations involve a counterfeiting claim because such claims allow plaintiffs to seek treble and statutory damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Counterfeiting claims often arise when there’s little factual dispute as to the similarity of the marks. As a result, defendants not only face greater exposure, they can have less room to maneuver. But by confirming that plaintiffs cannot take the likelihood of confusion element of their claim for granted even if the marks at issue are identical, the Ninth Circuit created more opportunities for factual disputes that can cut in defendants’ favor. This, in turn, can reduce the leverage plaintiffs benefit from in these situations.

The Ninth Circuit also left breadcrumbs for defendants hoping to argue that their identical marks are not counterfeit. In a footnote, the appellate court noted that the district court’s grant of summary judgment appeared to be based in part on its finding that “EYE DEW” was not itself a counterfeit as that term is defined under Section 1127 of the Lanham Act. The district court appeared to construe Section 1127 to allow a court to look beyond the mark and examine the product as a whole in determining whether the “spurious mark” is “identical with, or substantially indistinguishable” from the registered mark. The Ninth Circuit declined to resolve this issue on appeal, but left open the possibility that accused infringers can dispute that a seemingly identical mark is a counterfeit if the product it is attached to cuts against such a finding.

Taken together, the Ninth Circuit gave defendants two viable paths to defeat allegations of counterfeiting even when the marks are identical: (1) argue that the mark is not counterfeit, and (2) argue that even if it were, consumers are unlikely to be confused. Although not earth-shattering, the decision has the potential to shift leverage away from plaintiffs toward defendants in cases involving allegations of counterfeiting based only on the use of an identical mark.

The Fine Print

This may sound like a decision that unambiguously favors defendants, but the Ninth Circuit gave a little something to trademark owners as well. Despite rejecting the premise that confusion can be presumed and insisting that confusion must be assessed by examining the whole product at issue, the appellate court acknowledged in a footnote that there may be times the mark itself is so strong in the marketplace that “the use of an identical mark by itself may cause consumer confusion, even if other aspects of the products are different.” It remains to be seen how lower courts will interpret that guidance, but we can expect this footnote to receive a lot of attention from brand owners eager to avoid the consequences of the holding in this case.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.