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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

A Lucky Day at the Supreme Court for Lucky Brand

May 29, 2020

by Kaleb McNeely

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Lucky Brand has emerged victorious in the latest skirmish of its nearly 20-year trademark litigation battle with Marcel Fashions, a competitor in the apparel business. In Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., its second trademark decision of this term, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, holding that Lucky Brand is not precluded from raising a defense that it could have raised in a previous lawsuit between the same parties. The Lucky Brand opinion, however, rested on narrow grounds and left for another day the questions of whether there is such a thing as “defense preclusion” and, if so, when it is appropriate.

The first round of this war began in 2001, when Marcel sued Lucky Brand, alleging that Lucky Brand’s use of the phrase “Get Lucky” infringed Marcel’s registered trademark for GET LUCKY. That case ended in a settlement, whereby Lucky Brand agreed to cease using the phrase “Get Lucky,” and Marcel released certain claims regarding Lucky Brand’s use of its own trademarks (which included various marks containing the word “Lucky”). In the second round (commenced in 2005), Lucky Brand sued Marcel for violating certain of its trademark rights, and Marcel in turn filed several counterclaims based on Lucky Brand’s alleged continued use of the phrase “Get Lucky.” While Lucky Brand initially argued that the counterclaims were barred by the prior settlement agreement, it did not pursue that defense and the court in the 2005 Action permanently enjoined Lucky Brand from copying or imitating Marcel’s “Get Lucky” mark.

In 2011, Marcel again sued Lucky Brand for continuing to infringe the “Get Lucky” mark, though the allegations involved different marks used by Lucky Brand claimed to be infringing and different conduct than in the 2005 Action. After extended litigation, Lucky Brand moved to dismiss, arguing—for the first time since early in the 2005 Action—that Marcel had released its claims in the 2001 Action settlement agreement. Marcel countered that Lucky Brand could not invoke the release defense because it could have pursued that defense in the 2005 Action, but did not. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with Marcel, holding that the doctrine of “defense preclusion” prohibited Lucky Brand from raising the release defense in the 2011 Action when it had failed to do so in the 2005 Action. In a decision authored by Justice Sotomayor (who practiced in the field of trademarks and intellectual property law prior to ascending to the bench), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the Second Circuit.

The Supreme Court framed the key issue as whether “defense preclusion” is a valid application of res judicata, a term that encompasses both issue preclusion (also known as collateral estoppel) and claim preclusion. Issue preclusion, which precludes a party from re-litigating an issue actually decided in a prior case and necessary to the judgment, did not apply here because the scope of the settlement release was never actually litigated in the 2005 Action. The related doctrine of claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated. The question at issue here was whether claim preclusion barred Lucky Brands from asserting its settlement defense in the 2011 Action.

The Supreme Court noted at the outset that “[t]here may be good reasons to question any application of claim preclusion to defenses.” It did not need to resolve this more general question, however, because for claim preclusion to bar a defense in a later action, the two suits must arise from the same transaction or involve a “common nucleus of operative facts.” In Lucky Brand, the Supreme Court held that the two suits “were grounded on different conduct, involving different marks, occurring at different times” and “[t]hey thus did not share a ‘common nucleus of operative facts.’” Specifically, in the 2005 Action, Marcel’s claims were based on a combination of Lucky Brand trademarks and the use of the phrase “Get Lucky,” while the 2011 Action did not involve any use of the “Get Lucky” phrase. Moreover, the 2011 Action concerned conduct that occurred after the conclusion of the 2005 Action. The Supreme Court noted that this principle is particularly salient in the trademark context, “where the enforceability of a mark and likelihood of confusion between marks often turns on extrinsic facts that change over time” and “liability for trademark infringement turns on marketplace realities that can change dramatically from year to year.”

The Lucky Brand decision underscores what all legal practitioners take for granted: the facts matter. Here, because the two actions involved different facts and claims, the Supreme Court found that Lucky Brand’s failure to invoke its release defense in the 2005 Action did not bar it from raising that defense in the 2011 Action. As noted, however, the Supreme Court left undecided the larger issue of whether it is ever appropriate to apply claim preclusion to bar defenses, and there are compelling policy considerations for either position. On the one hand, one of the goals of claim preclusion is to resolve issues at the earliest opportunity – and this principle would seem equally applicable to defenses. On the other hand, requiring defendants to litigate every possible defense at every stage in litigation might have the deleterious effect of increasing litigation time and costs – which preclusion doctrines seek to minimize. It will be interesting to see how this issue plays out and whether the Supreme Court eventually resolves it definitively. In the meantime, litigators (particularly in the trademark field) would be well-advised to carefully analyze the relevant facts in order to determine whether a defense is required – or could potentially be barred – by the doctrine of “defense preclusion” since that doctrine appears to have survived for possible future application under the proper factual circumstances.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.