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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

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Competitor’s Claim of False Advertising Through Use of Certification Mark Dismissed

November 15, 2017

by Susan Progoff

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In Board-Tech Elec. Co. v. Eaton Electric Holdings LLC, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently dismissed a novel claim that a competitor’s authorized use of a third party’s certification mark in connection with products that allegedly did not comply with the mark’s certification standards constituted false advertising in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The court explained that allowing such a claim to proceed would enable a competitor to police a third party’s certification mark, something that is not permitted under the Lanham Act. The court also was concerned that permitting the claim to proceed would allow a private party to test its competitor’s products against industry standards as a basis for bringing a lawsuit that could expose its competitor’s sensitive information.

A certification mark is a mark that is used by someone other than the mark’s owner to certify something about the product or service with which it is used. Certification marks are most commonly used to certify that a product meets certain specifications or technical or quality standards, such as UL or GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, or that a product comes from a particular geographic location, such as IDAHO potatoes.

In this case, both parties sold competing electrical switches, which bore the UL certification mark. Many retailers would not sell, and consumers often would not buy, non-certified switches.

The UL certification mark is owned by Underwriters Laboratories. The registration of this mark states that the mark is used by persons Underwriters authorizes to indicate that “representative samplings of the products conform to [Underwriters’] safety requirements. . . .” To apply for UL certification, a switch manufacturer must provide Underwriters with six sets of representative samples of the switches to be certified. The samples must then pass a series of tests mandated by Underwriters. The UL certification does not guarantee that every product sold by the manufacturer complies with the standard; it certifies only that a purportedly representative sample complied.

The complaint alleged that “If a product carries [the UL certification], it means that UL found that a representative sample of that product met UL safety requirements and the manufacturer is representing that the product meets those requirements.” [emphasis in original] In addition, the complaint alleged that all of defendant’s light switches have permission to use the UL certification mark, and that in 2015-17 plaintiff tested samples of defendant’s switches that did not comply with the applicable UL standards. Based on this testing, plaintiff claimed that none of the models of defendant’s switches identified in the complaint complied with the UL standards, and alleged that because defendant’s switches did not meet the UL standards, defendant’s advertising of those switches as UL compliant constituted false advertising in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and related state statutes.

Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that plaintiff did not adequately allege that defendant’s use of the UL mark was a false representation. The complaint claimed that the use of the UL certification mark conveyed the false impression that defendant’s switches complied with the UL standard, although plaintiff acknowledged that each of defendant’s products had been granted permission to bear the UL mark and that Underwriters had “listed” or “classified” all of defendant’s switches at issue. Thus, plaintiff’s claim was based on the distinction between authorization to apply the mark and actual compliance with the UL standards. Plaintiff conceded authorization, but claimed that despite the authorization, defendant’s products failed to comply with the UL standards, and defendant was thereby deceiving consumers.

For plaintiff’s theory to succeed, it would need to prove that defendant’s authorized use of the UL mark was capable of being a deceptive use. The Court found defendant’s use not to be deceptive because the UL trademark registration explicitly stated that the “mark is used by persons authorized by applicant to indicate that the representative samplings of the products conform to safety requirements used by the applicant.” Defendant’s use of the mark indicates only that a representative sampling of defendants’ switches has conformed to Underwriters’ safety requirements, a fact that plaintiff conceded.

The court found that although plaintiff’s testing showed that some of defendant’s switches did not comply with the UL safety standards, if defendant was authorized to use the UL mark, then plaintiff was simply policing Underwriters’ mark, which is something only Underwriters may do. If plaintiff believed that Underwriters has not policed its mark, plaintiff could seek to have the registration cancelled under 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5).

The Court expressed concern about the issues that allowing this action to proceed would raise, such as allowing a competitor, rather than the mark’s owner, to police a certification mark, or enabling a competitor to test products against a standard as a ruse to obtain competitive information. For these reasons, the court dismissed the complaint.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.