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Trademarks

Consent Agreements - Not Always a Sure Path to Overcome Likelihood of Confusion Refusals in the USPTO

November 27, 2017

by Sandra Edelman

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The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board recently affirmed a refusal to register the mark 8-Bit Aleworks for beer based on two prior registrations for the mark 8 bit Brewing Company for beer and other alcoholic malt beverages, notwithstanding a consent agreement entered into between the applicant and the prior registrant. The result in In re 8-Brewing LLC, (TTAB Oct. 30, 2017) (non-precedential) is consistent with the Board’s precedential decision last year in In re Bay State Brewing Co. – coincidentally, another case involving beer – in which a consent agreement between the applicant and prior registrant was likewise held to be insufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion refusal.

The Board held as a threshold matter that the marks 8-Bit Aleworks and 8 bit Brewing Company were confusingly similar in light of the “identical commercial impression created by the marks” and the identity of the goods. The word ALEWORKS in the applicant’s mark and BREWING COMPANY in the registrant’s marks were disclaimed, and thus these highly descriptive terms did “little, if anything, to distinguish the marks.”

Turning to the consent agreement, the Board acknowledged the “seminal” precedent of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., holding that while a “naked consent” may carry little weight, “substantial weight should be conferred to more detailed agreements.” Detailed or not, however, the Board cautioned that “there is no per se rule that a consent, whatever its terms, will always tip the balance to finding no likelihood of confusion.”

Why did the consent agreement come up short in this case?

First, the applicant sought to register 8-bit Aleworks in standard characters, but an exhibit to the consent agreement and related provisions only referred to the design logo form of applicant’s mark. Further, the two registrations at issue included a standard character word mark and a composite mark with an accompanying design component, but the consent agreement exhibit showed only the composite mark registration with the design. According to the Board, it remained “unclear if Registrant is consenting only to the coexistence of the marks depicted in Exhibit A or if it is actually consenting to use and registration of applicant’s standard character mark, with or without the design element.”

Second, while the parties acknowledged the absence of actual confusion during the time in which their respective marks had been used,  the period of coexistence was quite brief – “a mere five months” at the time the consent agreement was signed.

Third, the agreement “fails to illustrate how Applicant’s and Registrant’s trade channels are different from one another.” Aside from stating that the parties will be using their marks in Arizona and California respectively, “the parties do not indicate how they will restrict their fields of use” and both will be “presumably be selling to the same types of individuals, restaurants or retailers and distributors.” Moreover, the Board noted that Arizona and California share a border (presumably leading to concern as to whether the two geographic markets could realistically be separated), and the agreement was silent as to other states in which the products might be sold.

Finally, while applicant and registrant agreed to use their marks “in conjunction with commercially distinct product packaging,” including dissimilar color schemes, no examples were shown as to what this distinct product packaging would look like or what distinctive color schemes would be used. As a result, the undertaking about using different product packaging was found to be deficiently “vague”. As the Board observed, “given the similarity in the marks, both being used on beer, it would have behooved Applicant and Registrant to have identified the specific distinctive trade dress each would be employing to distinguish the sources of the beer.”

In sum, while acknowledging that “consent agreements are frequently entitled to great weight”, the Board concluded that in view of the identity of the goods at issue and their trade channels and the strong similarity of the marks, the likelihood of confusion  was not sufficiently ameliorated by the terms of the consent agreement.

The takeaway from the 8-Brewing case and the prior decision in Bay State is that when the marks are very similar, the goods involved are identical and the parties are unable to establish a long track record without actual confusion, a consent agreement will need to meet a high bar to convince the Board that confusion is unlikely to occur. To pass muster, the agreement will need to refer to all forms of the marks at issue (and even better if the refused application at issue is a composite mark with a design element), depict examples of packaging deemed to be distinctively different, and explain in detail how channels of trade and/or geographic markets will be separately allocated.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.