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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

Derby Pie Eats Humble Pie

January 27, 2021

by Shannon Bjorklund and Alyssa Schaefer

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Rupp v. Courier-Journal, Inc. involves a dispute between the makers of DERBY-PIE®—a trademarked chocolate-nut pie—and a local newspaper that published two articles about other businesses creating other chocolate-nut desserts. Departing somewhat from its own ruling decades earlier in a separate case involving “Derby pie,” the Sixth Circuit doled out a loss to Rupp, affirming the district court’s holding that the defendant’s challenged use of the term “Derby pie” was a non-trademark use for which the newspaper was not liable. This is a case packed to the brim with sweet treats, racing horses, and a reminder that each race—er, litigation—is a fresh opportunity to win or lose.

Plaintiff Alan Rupp, owner of the bakery and Kentucky institution Kern’s Kitchen, sued the Courier-Journal for its use of the phrase “Derby Pie.” The Kern family developed its secret recipe for this chocolate-walnut-vanilla pie in the 1950s and registered a trademark for DERBY-PIE® in 1969. Since at least the 1980s, Kern’s Kitchen has repeatedly sued restaurants and publishers who have used the term “Derby pie” to refer generically to a chocolate-nut pie. See, e.g., Kern’s Kitchen, Inc. v. Bon Appetit, Case Nos. 87-5852, 87-6152 (6th Cir. July 7, 1988).

In past decades, this strategy seemed to work, even though defendants had claimed that the term “Derby pie” was a generic descriptor for a chocolate nut pie. For example, in the 1980s Kern’s sued the magazine Bon Appetit for its inclusion of an article for “Derby pie” in a cookbook. Although the district court granted summary judgment to Bon Appetit on the ground that “Derby pie” is a generic term, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that there was a genuine factual dispute. Id.

But earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit determined that the newspaper’s use of the term “Derby pie” in two articles was merely descriptive. The first piece, titled “Bourbon makes this Derby pie a state original,” shared a recipe for a walnut-chocolate-bourbon pie from a different local restaurant, the Captain’s Quarters. The second piece was a review of an up-and-coming new bakery, and included a reference to a Derby-pie-flavored macaron. The Courier-Journal argued that it was simply using the popular phrase to describe chocolate-nut flavored baked goods, not as an indicator of the source of goods (Kern’s).

Importantly, trademark law only applies if the mark is used in a way that designates the origin of goods. But Rupp tried to skip straight to the likelihood-of-confusion test, and the Sixth Circuit sent him back to the starting line. Rupp reminds trademark owners that before even contemplating whether a trademark use is actionable, including applying the eight-factor likelihood-of-confusion test, a court must find that the trademark was used in a legally-protected way. If a trademark is used in a non-trademark way—for example, in a descriptive way—trademark infringement laws simply don’t apply.

The Sixth Circuit’s decision was based on all three factors of the test used to determine whether the use of a trademark constitutes a “non-trademark” use:

  • The goods were “sufficiently different”: the newspaper Derby pie used bourbon and no vanilla, and there was no indication Kern’s had ever made any macarons.
  • Both newspaper articles clearly identified the source: other local establishments.
  • Without citing the earlier Sixth Circuit opinion in Kern’s v. Bon Appetit, the Sixth Circuit stated that “Derby Pie” was a common descriptive phrase to denote chocolate-nut flavored pie.

The Court’s decision that a descriptive, non-trademark use is not actionable is a straightforward application of trademark law. But the Court’s implicit suggestion that “Derby pie” is a generic term—at odds with the 1988 Sixth Circuit opinion stating there is an issue of fact as to whether it is generic—is notable. Perhaps the mark lost its uniqueness in the intervening three decades, and now approaches generic status. Or perhaps, as the Sixth Circuit suggested, the evidence presented by Rupp defeated his own case. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit explained that the DERBY-PIE® sold by Kern’s could not be confused with the “Derby pie” referenced in the newspaper, because the latter lacked a key ingredient that make DERBY-PIE® famous (vanilla), and included an ingredient never found in DERBY-PIE® (bourbon).

So, would a consumer confuse “Derby pie” with DERBY-PIE®? Perhaps, but Rupp confirms that we must first ask the “necessary preliminary question” of whether the mark was used in a non-trademark way. For brand owners, Rupp thus serves as a reminder to consider the broader context of how their marks are used by others when contemplating litigation.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.