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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

Earning Your Stripes (or Injunction): The Ninth Circuit Reiterates the Burden of Proving Irreparable Harm in Trademark Cases

May 29, 2018

by Benjamin Greenberg

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We previously posted about an Oregon federal district court’s summary judgment rulings, favorable to Adidas, in the storied battle between heavyweights Adidas and Skechers. (Adidas America, Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc. (D. Or. 2017)). Earlier in the case, the district court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the sale and marketing of Skechers’ Onix and Cross Court shoes, based on claims that the Onix infringes on the trade dress of Adidas’ Stan Smith shoe, and the Cross Court infringes and dilutes Adidas’ Three-Stripe trademark. This month, the Ninth Circuit reversed, in part, the preliminary injunction order, holding that the district court abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction with respect to the Cross Court because Adidas did not show it would be irreparably harmed from the sale of this model shoe. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling with respect to the Stan Smith, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding a likelihood of irreparable harm based on the record evidence. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling underscores that the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases is long gone, even where likelihood of success on the merits is established; instead, a party must submit credible evidence to show that irreparable harm is likely.

The district court’s preliminary injunction order entered in February 2016 found that Adidas had produced sufficient evidence of irreparable harm to warrant injunctive relief. It reasoned that: (a) Skechers’ infringement undermines Adidas’ substantial investment in building its brand and reputation of its trademarks and trade dress; and (b) Skechers’ attempt to “piggy back” off of Adidas’ efforts by copying or closely imitating Adidas’ marks means Adidas loses control over its trademarks, reputation, and goodwill—“a quintessential irreparable injury.” The district court order relied on evidence presented by Adidas that: (1) it had spent tens of millions promoting the Stan Smith, and nearly forty million annually on goods bearing the Three-Stripe mark; (2) it spent significant time and money in building and maintaining its perception among consumers as a premium sports brand, whereas consumers perceive Skechers as a “lower end value brand”, based on testimony from its marketing executive; and (3) consumer survey evidence that approximately 20% of surveyed consumers believed that Onix was made by, approved by, or affiliated with Adidas, indicating that Adidas’ carefully constructed brand image is likely to be confused with or associated with Skechers’ value brand. The district court thus concluded that “Adidas had produced evidence that Skechers’ continued sale of its Onix and other contested shoes will harm Adidas’ reputation and goodwill—harm that is not compensable by money damages.”

The district court also found that Adidas had produced evidence that Skechers’ infringing footwear will diminish Adidas’ ability to create scarcity and drive demand for the Stan Smith -- a strategy Adidas had employed in 2013 in advance of its “reintroduction campaign.” Finally, the district court noted that Adidas’ Director of Sports Style Brand Marketing testified that the Stan Smith is one of Adidas’ most coveted shoes, and it works to control every aspect of the shoe that it can (materials, price, seller, who is seen wearing it, etc.). The district court reasoned that Skechers’ infringing shoes are likely to irreparably harm Adidas’ ability to control the quality of goods bearing Adidas marks or trade dress.

In affirming in part, and reversing in part, the Ninth Circuit’s likelihood of irreparable harm analysis largely hinged on its prior decision in Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013), in which the Court held that “[e]vidence of loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill [can] constitute irreparable harm,” so long as there is concrete evidence in the record of those things. With respect to the Stan Smith, the Ninth Circuit was persuaded that there was sufficient evidence from which the district court could conclude that Adidas was likely to suffer irreparable harm to its brand reputation and goodwill if the preliminary injunction did not issue. The Court relied on evidence in the record of significant investment in promoting the Stan Smith through specified and controlled avenues, significant media from various sources that was not initiated by Adidas, and evidence of Adidas’ efforts to carefully control the supply of Stan Smith and the damage that would occur if the market were flooded, in addition to the above-discussed consumer survey. In finding that the district court’s irreparable harm ruling was not clearly erroneous, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he extensive and targeted advertising and unsolicited media, along with tight control of the supply of Stan Smiths, demonstrate that [A]didas has built a specific reputation. And, the customer surveys demonstrate that intangible benefits will be harmed if the Onix stays on the market because consumers will be confused about the source of the shoes.”

In contrast, the Court found that there was no evidence in the record that could support a finding of irreparable harm with respect to the allegedly-infringing Cross Court. The Court noted that Adidas advanced a narrow argument of irreparable harm as to the Cross Court: that Skechers harmed Adidas’ ability to control its brand image because consumers who see others wearing Cross Court shoes will associate the allegedly lesser-quality Cross Courts with Adidas and its Three-Stripe Mark (i.e. post-sale confusion). The Court first reasoned that Adidas’ theory relies on the notion that Adidas is viewed by consumers as a premium brand, while Skechers is viewed as a lower-quality, discount brand; and that Adidas did not set forth probative evidence of Skechers’ less favorable reputation. According to the Court, the only evidence in the record on this point was from Adidas employees, and Adidas did not provide sufficient specificity regarding consumer perception. The Court thus concluded that that the district court’s ruling that Skechers is viewed as a “value brand” is unsupported and conclusory, not grounded in evidence offered by Adidas.

The Court also found that Adidas’ theory of post-sale confusion conflicted with its theory on the merits, and counterintuitive, begging the question: “[h]ow would consumers who confused Cross Courts for Adidas shoes be able to surmise, from afar, that those shoes were of low quality? If the ‘misled’ consumers could not asses the quality of the shoe from afar, why would they think any different about Adidas’ products? In which case, how could Adidas’ premium brand possibly be hurt by any confusion?” Accordingly, the Court found that even if Skechers does make inferior products (or even if consumers tend to think so), there is no evidence that Adidas’ theory of post-sale confusion would cause consumers to associate such lesser-quality products with Adidas. And, even if consumers were likely to be confused as to the maker of the shoe, the Court cannot simply assume that such confusion will cause irreparable harm, where Adidas failed to provide concrete evidence that it will. The Court contrasted the more specific evidence presented by Adidas that its reputation and goodwill were likely to be irreparable harmed by the Onix based on Adidas’ extensive marketing efforts of the Stan Smith and its careful control of the supply.

Circuit Judge Clifton wrote a strongly-worded dissent chiding the majority’s Cross Court ruling on irreparable harm. Judge Clifton argued that the theory of post-sale confusion proffered by Adidas was not as narrow as the majority made it out to be, and quite consistent with a common theory of post-sale confusion in the trademark context. He explained that post-sale confusion could divert potential customers who believe they can obtain the prestige of Adidas’ goods without paying its normal prices. He mentioned his time in private practice thirty years ago defending Louis Vuitton against the sale of cheaper imitations. He was persuaded in those cases of the harm that could be caused (as Professor McCarthy described it) “if the prestige of carrying a bag with the Louis Vuitton trademark could be obtained at a fraction of the price, and if viewers could not tell the difference, the value of the trademark would be in jeopardy. And, if someone did confuse the cheap imitation for the real thing, the lesser quality of the imitator could further imperil the perceived value of the Louis Vuitton products and trademark.” He argued that a similar harm would occur to Adidas as a result of Skechers’ shoes imitating the Three Stripes mark.

Judge Clifton also vehemently disagreed with the majority’s ruling that there was no evidence in the record to support Adidas’ claim of irreparable injury. He argued that Adidas provided ample evidence of harm, including sworn declarations and live testimony by several Adidas employees supporting Adidas’ contention that it has established a reputation as a premium sports brand, whereas Skechers’ brand perception is a “value brand” or “lower-end brand.” Judge Clifton argued that the majority improperly elected to discount that evidence, by applying its own skepticism toward employee testimony, despite the fact that the district court found the evidence to be credible. He contended that the notion that the appellate court can decide for itself that evidence relied upon by the district court should be ignored because it was provided by an employee of a party is unsupported and badly misguided. Judge Clifton concluded that the district court was well within its discretion to infer that confusion between Skechers’ “lower-end” footwear and Adidas’ footwear was likely to harm Adidas’ reputation and goodwill as a premium shoe brand—which is precisely the type of harm that is “irreparable.”

Judge Clifton also reasoned that the district court’s determination did not even depend on establishing Skechers’ reputation as a lower quality brand; instead, the loss by Adidas of its control over its mark was by itself irreparably harmful. He argued that there was substantial evidence in the record regarding the value of Adidas’ mark and its management of the mark through investment and quality control over its product, evidence which the majority ignored.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision highlights the significant burden now imposed on parties seeking a preliminary injunction in trademark cases, a substantial departure from the presumption of irreparable harm that was applied once-upon-a-time ago. It also highlights a hurdle for the senior user that wants to obtain injunctive relief for infringement without delay, but now may be required to support its contention of irreparable harm with evidence extending beyond its own ranks, such as by commissioning a consumer survey, an undertaking that can delay the ability to seek immediate injunctive relief. In short, a trademark holder seeking to fully protect its mark from infringement must not only act quickly, it must also make a significant showing of irreparable harm at the preliminary injunction stage.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.