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Civil Procedure

Eleventh Circuit: Arbitration Clauses Are Like Makeup – They Only Cover So Much

February 9, 2017

by Kaleb McNeely

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The Kardashians, America’s favorite celebrity family, have been having a tough time of late, with Kim Kardashian being robbed at gunpoint in her Paris apartment, and her husband Kanye West attracting criticism for his support of Donald Trump.  A federal appeals court has recently added to the Kardashians’ woes.

In a pun-laden opinion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling in Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc. that the Kardashian sisters Kim, Kourtney, and Khloe (the “Kardashians”) could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to compel Plaintiff Kroma Makeup EU, LLC (“Kroma EU”) to arbitrate its claims.  The Eleventh Circuit noted that at “first blush, the issue appears to require application of Florida’s doctrine of equitable estoppel under which a party to an agreement who relies on it in a dispute with a non-party can be required by that non-party to comply with other terms of the agreement, including the arbitration clause.”  However, as the court put it, “there is a wrinkle in this case:  the arbitration clause which the non-party to the agreement is seeking to enforce is explicitly limited to disputes between the parties.”  Where the arbitration clause is so limited, the Eleventh Circuit held that the non-party (the Kardashians) could not “re-sculpt what appears on the face of a contract” to force a party to the agreement (Kroma EU) to arbitrate its claims against the Kardashians.

Background

Back in 2004, the make-up company By Lee Tillett, Inc. (“Tillett”) developed and registered the Kroma trademark for a cosmetics line.  In 2012, Tillet entered into an agreement giving Kroma EU the exclusive rights to sell and distribute Kroma products in the EU.  The agreement contained an arbitration clause, stating in relevant part that “the Parties agree that disputes arising between them . . .  should be considered [in] independent arbitration in the State of Florida, United States.”

While the Kroma EU agreement was in effect, the Kardashians entered into a licensing agreement with Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc. (“Boldface”) to create a Kardashian makeup line named “Khroma.”  Boldface filed a lawsuit against Tillet for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, and Tillett asserted counterclaims against Boldface and the Kardashians for trademark infringement. After that suit settled, Tillett refused to share any of the settlement proceeds with Kroma EU.  As a result, Kroma EU brought claims for trademark infringement and tortious interference with contract against Boldface, claims for vicarious liability for trademark infringement against the Kardashians, and a claim for promissory estoppel against Tillett.  The district court granted Tillett’s motion to compel Kroma EU to arbitrate, but denied the Kardashians’ motion to compel Kroma EU to arbitrate its claims against them.  The Kardashians appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

Analysis

The Eleventh Circuit first clarified that although federal law generally governs arbitration agreements, the “issue of whether a non-signatory to an agreement can use an arbitration clause in that agreement to force a signatory to arbitrate a dispute between them is controlled by state law,” and that the parties “agree that Florida law controls on that issue.”

The Kardashians argued that even though they are non-signatories to the agreement between Kroma EU and Tillett, they could nonetheless compel Kroma EU to arbitrate its claims by relying on Florida’s doctrine of equitable estoppel.  Under that doctrine, a defendant who is a non-signatory to an agreement containing an arbitration clause can force arbitration of a signatory’s claims when “the signatory . . . must rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting its claims against the non-signatory.”

As the court explained, however, a “non-signatory cannot invoke the doctrine to compel arbitration of claims that are not within the scope of the arbitration clause.”  Relying on the Florida District Court of Appeal’s decision in Koechli v. BIP International, Inc., 870 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), the Eleventh Circuit held that, to invoke equitable estoppel, the Kardashians would need to show not only that Kroma EU was relying on the agreement to assert its claims against them, but also that the scope of the arbitration clause covered the dispute.

The court then turned to the arbitration clause at issue, which by its own terms was limited to disputes between the “Parties.”  Because the Kardashians were not “Parties” to the agreement within the scope of the arbitration clause, the court held that they were barred from relying on equitable estoppel to compel arbitration of the claims against them.

In doing so, the court rejected the Kardashians’ argument that such a conclusion ignores the “equitable nature” of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which (in the Kardashians’ view) should operate to permit a non-signatory who is not bound by an agreement to enforce it notwithstanding the fact that the claims are outside the scope of the arbitration clause.  Indeed, the court found that “[s]uch a holding would be, well, inequitable” because it would “effectively be rewriting the agreement between the signatories about which disputes they would arbitrate to require one of them to arbitrate disputes that they had not agreed to.”  As the court explained, “Kroma EU never consented to arbitrate any disputes between it and the Kardashians or any other non-signatory.  All it consented to arbitrate were disputes between it and the other party, which was Tillett.”  By contrast, if the arbitration clause was not limited to disputes between the parties, but covered “any disputes concerning the validity, interpretation, etc., of the contract . . ., the Kardashians may have been able to use equitable estoppel to require Kroma EU to arbitrate the dispute between it and them.

Given the rash of pro-arbitration decisions from the federal courts in recent years, the Kroma EU decision might seem surprising.  It should not be, however, since the court did no more than affirm the basic contract law principle familiar to all first-year law school students:  contracts are generally limited by their terms, and may not be rewritten by courts (or parties to a litigation).  As the Eleventh Circuit artfully concluded:  “Like makeup, Florida’s doctrine of equitable estoppel can only cover so much . . . . The district court correctly denied the Kardashians’ motion to compel Kroma EU to arbitrate the dispute between them.”

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.