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Extraterritoriality of the Lanham Act: Fearsome Watchdog or Muzzled Chihuahua?

June 29, 2023

by Evan Everist, Julia Lisi, and Gloria Park

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How far does the Lanham Act’s reach extend? The Supreme Court gave us one answer in Abitron Austria GmbH et al. v. Hetronic International, Inc. and made it simple: not very far.

Hetronic is a U.S. company that manufactures remote controls for construction equipment.  Abitron (comprised of six non-U.S. companies) at one point sold Hetronic’s products as a licensed distributor.  However, Abitron eventually concluded it held rights to Hetronic’s intellectual property, including various trademarks.  Abitron then reverse engineered Hetronic’s products and began selling goods bearing those marks in Europe and the U.S.

Hetronic ultimately sued Abitron in the Western District of Oklahoma for trademark violations under Sections 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, both of which prohibit using a trademark “in commerce” that is likely to cause confusion.  The District Court awarded Hetronic approximately $96 million in damages and entered a permanent injunction barring Abitron from using Hetronic’s marks anywhere in the world.

We last discussed Hetronic after a Tenth Circuit decision that narrowed the injunction slightly to geographic locations where Hetronic had marketed and sold its products.  But the Tenth Circuit overall agreed that some of Abitron’s conduct in Europe could be enjoined by U.S. courts under the Lanham Act because Abitron’s actions had a substantial effect on U.S. commerce.  Abitron then appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the injunction was an impermissible extension of the Lanham Act to extraterritorial conduct—i.e., conduct outside the U.S.

Today, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Tenth Circuit’s decision, determining that the two provisions of the Lanham Act at issue cannot be applied extraterritorially.  The Court held that the Lanham Act only regulates use in commerce—i.e., the sale of goods or the provision of services—within the United States.  The Court’s analysis centers on a presumption against extraterritoriality, a “longstanding principle of American law” that assumes Congress generally only regulates domestic affairs, and not foreign conduct.  Four justices joined Justice Alito’s majority opinion, three joined Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, and Justice Jackson entered a separate concurrence with her insights on the definition of “use in commerce” as used in Section 1127 of the Lanham Act.

The Court applied a two-step framework to determine whether and to what extent the Lanham Act can regulate foreign conduct.

All Justices agreed that the first question is whether the statute or provision explicitly states that it should apply to foreign conduct.  In other words, has Congress “affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that” the provision at issue “‘should apply to foreign conduct’”?  The Lanham Act does not explicitly state that it regulates foreign conduct, which cuts against applying the Lanham Act to regulate conduct abroad.

Because the Lanham Act is not explicitly extraterritorial, the Court then moved to step two, which was far more contentious.  The majority concluded the relevant inquiry for this step is to identify the “focus” of the statute and decide whether “conduct relevant to that focus” occurred in the U.S.  Both are required.

The parties offered different interpretations of what they believed the “focus” of the Lanham Act provisions were in this case for purposes of the second step of the framework.  Hetronic argued that the focus of the statute was to protect the goodwill of trademark owners and to prevent consumer confusion.  Abitron argued that the focus of the statute was to prevent infringement of trademarks. The U.S. government, as amicus curiae, took the middle ground and posited that the focus of the statute was consumer confusion.

Instead of clarifying the Lanham Act’s focus, the Court concluded that, because the conduct at issue entirely occurred outside the U.S., there was no need to actually discern the focus of the statute. In other words, the fact that there was no conduct or domestic use in commerce renders the focus of the Lanham Act irrelevant.  This second step, the majority clarified, is designed for "claims that involve both domestic and foreign activity," which is not the case here.

Justice Jackson agreed that “use in commerce” is “the dividing line between foreign and domestic applications” of the Lanham Act, but added that any downstream sale of a good in the U.S. market constitutes use in commerce. In other words, the active resale of a good by an individual consumer, who bought a product abroad, would constitute use in commerce and open the original seller of the good to liability under the Lanham Act.

Contrary to the framework outlined by the majority, however, Justice Sotomayor found common ground with the U.S. government’s opinion that the focus of the two provisions of the Lanham Act at issue is consumer confusion.  This interpretation focuses on the impact of foreign conduct on the U.S. market instead of exclusively on “the location of the original sale of the infringing product or the location of the trademark owner’s business.”  In other words, Justice Sotomayor would conclude that the Lanham Act provisions at issue extend to “activities abroad when there is a likelihood of consumer confusion in the United States.”  (Emphasis added.)

The at-odds opinions may be attributable to the manner in which the justices choose to interpret the case Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. (which involved a defendant’s allegedly infringing activities occurring in both Mexico and the United States), with the majority determining it is inapplicable and wholly distinguishable from the facts of Hetronic because it “implicate[s] both domestic conduct and a likelihood of domestic confusion,” and the Sotomayor concurrence finding Steele to persuasively conclude that “infringing acts consummated abroad fall under the purview of the Lanham Act when they generate consumer confusion in the United States.”  In the majority’s view, the concurrence’s position would render the presumption against extraterritoriality, referred to in other cases as a “watchdog,” “nothing more than a muzzled Chihuahua.”

Ultimately, the Court vacated and remanded the case.  The majority does not outline the bounds of “use in commerce.”  Whether the Lanham Act applies to goods sold indirectly into U.S. commerce remains to be seen.  The TMCA will continue to monitor this case on remand and the impacts of the decision in the broader trademark landscape.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.