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Fifth Circuit Denies Defendants’ “Halftime” Attempt to Shift Fees Under the DTSA

November 28, 2018

by Benjamin Greenberg

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Earlier this month, the Fifth Circuit ruled that under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1836, et seq.) (“DTSA”), a defendant is not the “prevailing party” by virtue of a plaintiff voluntarily dismissing a DTSA claim, where the dismissal is without prejudice.  The DTSA provides for fee shifting in favor of a “prevailing party” defendant in the event that “a claim of the misappropriation is made in bad faith, which may be established by circumstantial evidence.”  As a matter of first impression, in Dunster Live, LLC v. Lonestar Logis Mgmt. Co., LLC, et al. the Fifth Circuit determined that the defendants were not the prevailing party under the DTSA when a plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its DTSA claim shortly after the trial court denied plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.  In affirming the lower court’s ruling that the defendants were not the prevailing party, the Court reasoned that federal authority in the context of other similar federal fee-shifting statutes establish that “[a] dismissal without prejudice means no one has prevailed; the litigation is just postponed with the possibility of the winner being decided at a later time in a new arena.”

In Dunster, the plaintiff and defendants were formerly members of the same LLC that held a contract with the state of Texas to construct and build the blue signs seen on Texas highways advertising food, lodging, and gas stations located at approaching exits.  In the months leading up to the expiration of the contract, the defendants formed a new company without the plaintiff, and won the follow-on contract.  The plaintiff sued the defendants in federal court in Texas claiming that the defendants stole proprietary software and a database in violation of the DTSA, and also alleged related state law claims.  The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to stop the new company from taking over the contract, which was denied.

Following the denial, the plaintiff sought permission to dismiss the case without prejudice, explaining that it no longer wished to pursue the federal trade secret claim, which was the only basis for subject matter jurisdiction.  The defendants opposed the motion on the ground that the plaintiff was engaging in “bad faith” by seeking to avoid an adverse ruling and liability for substantial attorneys’ fees.  The trial court rejected the defendants’ argument and allowed the dismissal without prejudice, not reaching the question of whether the misappropriation theory was raised in bad faith.  After the dismissal, the defendants sought an award of in excess of $600,000 in attorneys’ fees that they had incurred in the litigation.  The trial court denied the fee request, reasoning that a dismissal without prejudice did not make the defendants the prevailing party because the plaintiff is “free to resurrect its claims against the defendant[s] and may prevail at a later date.”  In fact, the plaintiff filed essentially the same lawsuit in state court, excepting the DTSA claim, just six days after the federal court dismissal.

The defendants appealed the denial of their fee request, but did not appeal the trial court’s ruling that the dismissal could be entered without prejudice. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the fee request, finding that for a party to be eligible to obtain fees under the DTSA, they must (a) prevail; and (b) must do so under the listed scenarios provided under the statute that also require a showing of bad faith or malice.  Relying on federal authority interpreting other federal fee-shifting statutes, the Court held that a party does not prevail when the plaintiff dismisses its DTSA claim without prejudice.  In so ruling, the Court rejected defendants’ argument that this rule allows plaintiffs to evade paying the defendant’s fees by strategically seeking a dismissal without prejudice once a plaintiff realizes the suit is doomed.  The Court reasoned that this argument ignores the fact that, under FRCP 41(a), a dismissal without prejudice requires court approval unless the dismissal occurs very early in the game (i.e. prior to the defendant filing either an answer or a motion for summary judgment), and one of the reasons a court may deny such a request is bad faith on plaintiff’s part; if a court finds bad faith, it can require a dismissal with prejudice.  In such instances, the defendant may very well be the prevailing party.  The Court noted that Rule 11 also provides a check against bad faith litigation conduct, as sanctions can be levied against a party litigating in bad faith even where there is no prevailing party.

The Court likewise rejected the defendants’ argument that they prevailed when the Court rejected plaintiff’s attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction.  Borrowing from a sport’s analogy, the Court quipped that “prevailing party status ordinarily requires being ahead when the final whistle blows in a case, not at halftime…. Taking the lead early in the lawsuit thus did not make the [d]efendants eligible for fees….  The dispute has now been rescheduled for state court, where the winner will be decided.  Because there was never a final score in this federal lawsuit, the [DTSA] does not allow attorney’s fees.”

In light of the Court’s bright line ruling, defendants seeking recovery of their fees after a halftime voluntary dismissal of a plaintiff’s meritless or frivolous DTSA claim would be well-advised to put their eggs into the basket of arguing that the claim should be dismissed with prejudice, under a bad faith theory or otherwise.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.