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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

Honey Badger Don’t Care About Trademark Infringement, But The Ninth Circuit Does

December 20, 2018

by Ben Kappelman

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Long ago (by internet standards), a spoof of Discovery Channel-style nature videos went viral. “The Crazy Nastyass Honey Badger” is a three-minute montage of wild honey badgers running across the desert, hunting prey, and, perhaps most disgusting, eating a snake, all set to classical music. The narrator, Christopher Gordon, describes the honey badgers’ activities without resorting to “science-y” language, saying things like “watch it run in slow motion”; “watch it dig, look at that digging,” and “it doesn’t care about being stung by bees, nothing can stop the honey badger when it’s hungry.” Gordon’s patter drove the video to more than 89 million views on YouTube. Gordon repeatedly tells the viewer “honey badger don’t care,” “honey badger don’t give a s- - -,” and more vulgar variations.

After the internet-consuming public went nuts for honey badgers, Gordon obtained federal trademark registrations for “Honey Badger Don’t Care” for audio books, greeting cards, mugs, clothing, Christmas products, and similar goods. Gordon licensed the mark for honey badger costumes, toys, apparel, posters, and other products. Gordon also licensed the phrase for greeting cards, leading to heartfelt birthday greetings like, “Honey Badger Don’t Care About Your Birthday.” (Gordon never registered “honey badger don’t give a s- - -”).

Around the same time, Drape Creative, Inc. and Papyrus-Recycled Greetings, Inc. started developing their own honey-badger themed greeting cards. Their products doubled down on the “honey badger don’t give a s- - -” phrase, featuring it on Election Day, birthday, and Halloween cards. Drape Creative’s president drafted the cards. He later testified that he did not recall what inspired his designs and that he had never heard of a video involving a honey badger.

Gordon sued in 2015, alleging trademark infringement under the Lanham Act and other claims. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding the First Amendment protected their products. Gordon appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed.

The appellate court applied Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), which modifies the two-element likelihood of confusion test for trademark infringement claims to protect freedom of expression. Usually, a trademark plaintiff only need prove that it has a valid, protectable mark and that the defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion. Under Rogers, the Lanham Act applies to an expressive work only if a defendant’s use of a protected mark (1) is not artistically relevant to the work, or (2) explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or content of the work. To invoke the Rogers test, a defendant must make a threshold showing that its allegedly infringing use is part of an expressive work protected by the First Amendment. The plaintiff must then prove at least one of the Rogers criteria in addition to the two Lanham Act elements. The Ninth Circuit easily concluded that Gordon had failed to prove the first Rogers criterion—the honey badger phrases used in the greeting cards were the punchlines on which the cards’ humor turned.

The second Rogers criterion gave the court pause. In all of its previous decisions applying Rogers, the court had held that the First Amendment protected the accused use. The court decided, however, that this case demonstrated Rogers’ “outer limits.”

The court sought to clarify the “explicitly mislead” requirement, while ensuring it remained harder to satisfy than the usual likelihood-of-confusion element of a Lanham Act claim. The court held that an affirmative misleading statement of the mark holder’s sponsorship or endorsement it not required to run afoul of the Rogers test. But, the court continued, use of a mark alone might explicitly mislead a consumer if consumers would ordinarily identify the source of the product by the mark itself, and the junior use was sufficiently similar to the senior use of the mark to create confusion.

The court contrasted the honey badger cards with earlier works found to be protected by the First Amendment. Those included the song “Barbie Girl” by the Danish band Aqua, a 1997 pop hit that parodied values the songwriter associated with Barbie dolls. (Despite pre-dating YouTube, “Barbie Girl” is vastly more popular than the honey badger video, garnering more than 568 million views.) The court also distinguished the use of a name similar to that of a trademark-protected name for a club in East Los Angles in the video game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas. The court said these junior users utilized the marks in different ways than the senior user—no one would think Mattel produced the “Barbie Girl” song, nor would anyone think a sophisticated video game originated from a small Los Angeles club.

The appellate court decided there was a jury question as to whether use of the phrase “honey badger don’t give a s- - -” was explicitly misleading. Defendants’ use of the phrase without other text and evidence that consumers rely on marks inside of cards to identify their source both suggested the explicitly misleading criterion was satisfied. A jury could conclude defendants used the phrase in the same way Gordon did on his greeting cards and added minimal artistic expression, leading to liability. On the other hand, the court noted that the defendants used slight variations on the phrase and included their website on the back of the cards, which could lead a jury to find in their favor.

The case now goes back to the trial court. Absent settlement or a loss on other grounds, one federal jury will be lucky enough to enjoy (or endure) an amusing take on wild honey badgers, their athletic and eating habits, and what it all means for the sale of greeting cards.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.