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If This Copyright Law Post Mentions Hamilton, You’re More Likely to Read It

June 18, 2018

by Stefan Szpajda

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This post is about Hamilton. Well, sort of. It’s actually about copyright law. But keep reading!

Most people who have attempted to buy a highly sought-after ticket—like, say, a ticket for Hamilton—have experienced the frustration of being beaten to the punch by armies of bots that purchase large quantities of tickets only to resell them at a profit on the secondary market. In fact, Ticketmaster estimates that for some shows 30-40% of all Hamilton tickets are purchased by such bots. Sellers have struggled with how best to respond. Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige Entm’t, Inc., a recent federal court decision out of the Central District of California, suggests that the Copyright Act may prove to be a useful tool to curb the practice.

What’d I Miss?

Ticketmaster accused several companies, individuals, and unnamed “Doe” defendants of—among other things—copyright infringement. The district court considered defendants’ motion to dismiss four categories of claims brought by Ticketmaster in its First Amended Complaint: (a) three claims under the Copyright Act, (b) Digital Millennium Copyright Act, (c) Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and (d) California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act. We focus here only on Ticketmaster’s copyright claims.

In short, Ticketmaster alleged that two of the Doe defendants (the “Bot Developers”), in the course of developing the bots later used by the other named defendants to purchase tickets, downloaded and stored the pages and code associated with Ticketmaster’s website and mobile app. Per Ticketmaster, this use of its code violated the Copyright Act.

Taking a step back, this wasn’t Ticketmaster’s first attempt to use the Copyright Act to stop bots from purchasing tickets. The court had previously granted defendants’ motion to dismiss Ticketmaster’s copyright claims as pled in its original Complaint. Ticketmaster’s initial copyright infringement theory relied on its allegation that defendants’ use of bots to purchase tickets violated several enumerated conditions in Ticketmaster’s Terms of Use (“TOU”), and thus caused defendants’ continued use of Ticketmaster’s platform to infringe Ticketmaster’s copyrights.

Although rejected by the court, the copyright claims in Ticketmaster’s original Complaint had some support in law. In the Ninth Circuit, a copyright owner who grants a nonexclusive, limited license ordinarily waives the right to sue licensees for copyright infringement, and it may sue only for breach of contract. If the licensee acts outside the scope of the license, however, the licensor may sue for copyright infringement. A claim for copyright infringement can only be made where the licensee’s actions (1) exceed the license’s scope (2) in a manner that implicates one of the licensor’s exclusive statutory rights. For a licensee’s violation of a contract to constitute copyright infringement, there must also be a nexus between the breached condition and the licensor’s exclusive rights. Otherwise, a copyright holder could designate any disfavored conduct by the licensee as copyright infringement.

Ticketmaster’s original copyright claim thus hinged on the distinction between conditions and covenants—i.e., contractual terms that limit a license’s scope are conditions, while all other license terms are covenants. Because breaches of conditions can result in copyright infringement, while breaches of covenants are only actionable under contract law, the court’s finding that Ticketmaster’s terms were covenants and not conditions doomed its copyright claim. Indeed, the court Said No to Ticketmaster’s original Complaint by dismissing it without leave to amend to the extent that Ticketmaster’s copyright claim was based on defendants’ use of bots to exceed the TOU limitations on the number of page refreshes or ticket requests, or to place a large load on Ticketmaster’s servers.

Ticketmaster wasn’t Helpless and found a way to Stay Alive by pleading its copyright claim in a way that went beyond merely alleging that defendants’ unauthorized use of its platform violated its TOU.

Copyright Claims Will Be Back

The court dismissed Ticketmaster’s original Complaint because it ultimately traced its copyright claims to defendants’ alleged violations of Ticketmaster’s TOU. In contrast, the First Amended Complaint relies on a more complex set of allegations. Namely, Ticketmaster alleges direct copyright infringement against the Bot Developers who built the programs used to purchase tickets, and secondary infringement against the other defendants who induced the Bot Developers’ infringing actions.

Are Websites Protectable Under the Copyright Act?

A threshold question addressed by the court was whether Ticketmaster’s website is protectable under the Copyright Act. The court found it is, because—like computer software generally—websites contain three distinct layers of content: literal elements (e.g., source code), individual non-literal elements (e.g., screen displays), and dynamic non-literal elements (e.g., interactive elements generated specifically for a user in real-time). Each content layer is subject to the Copyright Act.

Direct Infringement

The act of downloading and storing the pages and code of a website qualifies as making a “copy” under the Copyright Act. In its First Amended Complaint, Ticketmaster alleges that the Bot Developers have directly infringed Ticketmaster’s reproduction rights by doing just that. The court found Ticketmaster met its burden despite failing to allege with particularity details related to defendants’ actual copying of its code.

Typically, in the absence of direct evidence it is sufficient for a copyright plaintiff to allege that (1) the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work prior to the alleged copying and (2) the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s work are substantially similar. The twist in Ticketmaster’s complaint is a similar but distinct formulation: Ticketmaster alleges that (1) the Bot Developers developed bots adept at purchasing large quantities of tickets, and (2) Ticketmaster’s website and mobile app are complex platforms that each contain several layers of protection and security measures. Ticketmaster’s claim, at the pleading stage, thus depended on its assertion that developing such capable bots would necessarily require deep study of Ticketmaster’s website and source code, which in turn means that the Bot Developers must have downloaded and stored literal or non-literal elements of Ticketmaster’s website and mobile app. The court found Ticketmaster’s theory about the compatibility of defendants’ bots with its platforms to be a “compelling variation” on the substantial similarity test for circumstantial proof of copyright infringement.

Secondary Infringement

To bring a copyright claim against the remaining defendants, Ticketmaster accuses them of secondary copyright infringement by inducing, causing, or materially contributing to the Bot Developers’ creation of bots, with knowledge that the Bot Developers would have to infringe Ticketmaster’s copyrights to create the bots. Ticketmaster alleges that the Bot Developers created the bots, and that the other defendants then used those bots to purchase large quantities of tickets. The court found these facts sufficient to indicate a relationship between defendants and the Bot Developers of mutual benefit to both parties, and found it reasonable to infer that defendants contributed to the Bot Developers’ infringement as part of this relationship. The court found that Ticketmaster has stated a claim for defendants’ contributory infringement based on the Bot Developers’ direct infringement.

License Defense

The court rejected defendants’ license defense based on the argument that Ticketmaster’s TOU provides users a license to copy Ticketmaster’s website. This reinforces the value of Ticketmaster’s creative approach to its copyright claim.

Recall that in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss Ticketmaster’s original Complaint, the court devoted considerable attention to whether the provisions of Ticketmaster’s TOU were conditions or covenants. In seeking to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, defendants reiterated that, under the court’s first order, the provisions of the TOU are covenants and that the violation of a covenant gives rise only to a contract claim. The court found that this renewed argument misconstrued the court’s earlier order, the relevant Ninth Circuit authority, and the underlying copyright laws—i.e., a violation of a provision of a TOU is copyright infringement if the violation implicates one of the copyright holder’s exclusive rights, regardless of whether the violated provision is a covenant or a condition.

Satisfied

One reason Ticketmaster’s First Amended Complaint survived is that it avoided the public policy concerns raised in its original Complaint. The court explained that grounding copyright claims in simple breaches of contract could allow software copyright holders to designate any disfavored conduct during software use as copyright infringement. But the court found this concern is not implicated by Ticketmaster’s First Amended Complaint because Ticketmaster alleges direct infringement by a small number of sophisticated software developers and marketers and thus “will not expose masses of Ticketmaster users to copyright liability merely because they violated Ticketmaster’s own house rules.”

What Comes Next?

Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige Entm’t, Inc. shows the Copyright Act’s potential to combat bot-driven online purchases of tickets. More generally, it affirms that—especially in unsettled areas of law—a thoughtfully pled complaint can overcome unfavorable precedent.

The TMCA will continue to monitor the case and will report again on significant developments.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.