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Trademarks

Lack of Bona Fide Intent to Use and Its Consequences According to the 6th Circuit

March 1, 2017

by Sandra Edelman and Kaydi Osowski

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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an important decision about the bona fide intent requirement when filing an intent to use (“ITU”) application and the consequences when there is a lack of bona fide intent as to some, but not all, of the goods or services identified in an application.  While the issue of bona fide intent to use is typically adjudicated by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the issue in Kelly Services Inc. v. Creative Harbor LLC arose in federal court as part of a dispute over who had priority to use the mark WORKWIRE in connection with employment-based software applications.  The appellate court decision generated both a majority and dissenting opinion as to whether an application should be voided in its entirety, or selected goods stricken, when the lack of bona fide intent affects only some of the goods in the application.

Creative Harbor is a start-up technology company that creates original content to be used across all media platforms.  On February 19, 2014, at 6:28 and 7:56 p.m. EST, Creative Harbor filed two ITU applications for the mark WORKWIRE covering 36 different goods and services, including computer application software for a variety of functions.

Kelly Services is large staffing agency that began developing an app for its employment placement services in early 2013.  Soon after, Kelly Services decided to call its app “WorkWire.”  The app was released on the Apple App Store at 8:11 p.m. EST on February 19, 2014, with the first download occurring on February 20, 2014.  Thus, the filing of Creative Harbor’s ITU applications and the release of Kelly Services’ app occurred within hours of each other on the exact same day, setting up a priority battle.

Less than a month after Kelly Services’ app was released, Creative Harbor sent a protest letter to Kelly Services demanding that it stop using “WorkWire” as the name of its app.  In response, Kelly Services filed suit in federal court in the Eastern District of Michigan seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment that: (i) it had priority over Creative Harbor to the “WorkWire” mark; (ii) its use of “WorkWire” did not infringe upon Creative Harbor’s rights; and (iii) any rights Creative Harbor had in the WORKWIRE mark were invalid.  On May 2, 2014, Creative Harbor counterclaimed for declaratory judgment that it had superior rights in the WORKWIRE mark because its ITU applications for the mark were filed before Kelly Services commenced use.

Soon after Creative Harbor’s applications were published for opposition, Kelly Services opposed them and the opposition proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of the district court action.

Creative Harbor’s CEO, Christian Jurgensen, testified at a deposition that he instructed his attorney “to ‘protect the [WORKWIRE] mark’ as to different products and services for which the Mark ‘could’ eventually be used ‘in case the brand got bigger.”  Mr. Jurgensen also testified that:

  • At the time the applications were filed, Creative Harbor had “clear ideas” for some of the goods and services, and some were meant for “future exploration.”
  • Creative Harbor did not intend to use WORKWIRE on a computer game.
  • He did not know what employee relations information services referred to.
  • With regard to professional credentialing verification services, “he simply wanted to keep the option open to do that at some point.”
  • As to business consulting services, Creative Harbor “could perhaps perform those services at some point in the future.”

On cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of priority, based on Mr. Jurgensen’s testimony, the district court concluded that Creative Harbor lacked the requisite bona fide intent to use the WORKWIRE mark on certain of the goods and services covered by its applications.  As a result, Creative Harbor’s applications were held to be void in their entirety.

On appeal, Creative Harbor argued that the district court erred in finding that it lacked a bona fide intent to use the WORKWIRE mark on some of the goods and services contained in the applications, but even if it did lack the requisite intent, its applications should not have been voided in their entirety.

The majority and dissenting opinions in Kelly Services agreed that Creative Harbor lacked a bona fide intent to use the WORKWIRE mark on at least some of the goods and services identified in the two applications at issue.  Based on the deposition testimony of Creative Harbor’s principal, the district court correctly held that Creative Harbor lacked a “firm intention” to use the mark with all of the goods and services identified in the applications and had included some of the goods and services merely to “reserve a right” in the mark.

Where the majority and dissenting opinions diverged was in the legal consequences of lacking a bona fide intent to use the mark on some but not all of the goods and services in the application.  The majority opinion conducted a detailed analysis of the procedural context and holdings in four decisions of the TTAB on the issue, which were not easy to reconcile.  One such case was Grand Canyon West Ranch LLC v. Hualapai Tribe, 78 USPQ2d 1696 (TTAB 2006), where the application at issue was filed based on use in commerce (i.e., not ITU), and the applicant had failed to use the mark in connection with all of the goods listed in the application prior to the filing date.  The TTAB in Grand Canyon held that absent proof of fraud or that an applicant failed to use its mark on all of the goods or services in a use-based application, the application will not be deemed void in its entirety.  Rather, the applicant should be permitted to cure the problem by amending its application to delete the offending goods.

The 6th Circuit ultimately concluded that the approach in Grand Canyon was correct, and should be applied by analogy to ITU applications.  Thus, the majority opinion held that absent fraud or proof that bona fide intent to use was lacking for all of the goods and services in an ITU application, the correct remedy is not to declare the application void ab initio, but rather to delete the goods or services for which an intent to use was lacking.  This was deemed the appropriate result whether or not an applicant took affirmative steps to seek an amendment of its application to delete the offending goods.

The dissenting appellate judge credited the majority opinion with providing a “more-or-less accurate summary of the inconsistent landscape of TTAB precedent that has led to the dispute in this appeal....”  However, the dissent read the four decisions by the TTAB differently, concluding that in order to avoid invalidation of an application in its entirety,  an applicant must move to amend its application to delete goods for which bona fide intent to use cannot be established: “TTAB precedent suggests that it is incumbent upon the applicant to amend its application to eliminate portions of its [Section] 1(b) ITU application for which it cannot demonstrate bona fide intent, or else risk having the entire application voided.”  Because Creative Harbor did not take advantage of this remedy, the dissent maintained that the district court had correctly voided both of Creative Harbor’s applications ab initio.

It will be interesting to watch for subsequent cases in the TTAB to see if the Board agrees with the majority opinion of the 6th Circuit in Kelly Services or further clarifies the import of the four decisions analyzed by the federal appellate court.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.