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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Defamation and Libel

Lenny Dykstra: His Reputation Precedes Him

June 9, 2020

by Jonathan Montcalm

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In the 1980s and early 1990s, thousands of posters of former Major League star Lenny Dykstra undoubtedly decorated the bedroom walls of New York Mets and Philadelphia Phillies fans. Following a recent decision by Justice Robert Kalish of the New York Supreme Court (the trial-level court in New York), Dykstra now may be a poster child of a different sort: the libel-proof plaintiff. The notorious Dykstra had his libel suit against his former teammate Ron Darling dismissed in Dykstra v. St. Martin’s Press LLC, et al.  Dykstra—who most recently has been making a meal out of celebrating his second straight year without an arrest—could not pursue his libel claim because he is the rare libel-proof plaintiff, incapable of being damaged by the allegedly defamatory statements in Darling’s latest book, 108 Stitches: Loose Threads, Ripping Yarns, and the Darndest Characters from My Time in the Game.

Dykstra sued Darling, his ghost writer and his publisher for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of a story in Darling’s book describing a racist tirade by Dykstra aimed at Dennis “Oil Can” Boyd, an African American pitcher for the Boston Red Sox, right before the opening pitch of Game 3 of the infamous 1986 World Series—the pivotal game won by the Mets in which they began to turn the Series in their favor, aided in large part by Dykstra’s lead-off home run off of Boyd.

As described by Darling, “Oil Can was on the receiving end of the ugliest piece of vitriol I’ve ever heard – in a bar, on a baseball diamond . . . anywhere . . . . [A]s Oil Can was taking his final warmups on the mound, Lenny was in the on-deck circle shouting every imaginable and unimaginable insult and expletive in his direction – foul, racist, hateful, hurtful stuff.” Although Darling avoided repeating the specific taunts from Dykstra, he suggested that the taunting was “worse . . . than anything Jackie Robinson might have heard, his first couple of times around the league.”

Dykstra claimed that Darling’s story was libelous and (a) tarnished the Mets’ 1986 World Championship, (b) branded Dykstra as a racist; (c) was maliciously intended to attack Dykstra, his prowess as a professional athlete, and his ability to earn a living going forward, and (d) caused Dykstra emotional distress and irreparably harmed his reputation. The defendants sought dismissal based in part on the rarely used libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, which bars a defamation claim as a matter of law where false statements on a particular subject cannot further harm the plaintiff’s reputation on that subject. As the court put it, this defense is not based upon “whether the statements were defamatory in nature but rather whether Dykstra’s reputation precludes this action.”

The defendants argued that Dykstra’s reputation as a racist, bullying bigot meant that he could not be damaged further by Darling’s story. In a pointed opinion, the court agreed, ultimately reaching the damning conclusion that “[P]rior to the publication of [Darling’s latest] book, Dykstra was infamous for being, among other things, racist, misogynist, and anti-gay, as well as a sexual predator, a drug-abuser, a thief, and an embezzler. Further, Dykstra had a reputation—largely due to his autobiography—of being willing to do anything to benefit himself and his team, including using steroids and blackmailing umpires.”

Besides the headline-grabbing nature of the court’s recounting of Dykstra’s exploits—and Darling’s story about one specific and particularly shameful episode of the Dykstra experience—this case is notable because the court applied the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine at the motion-to-dismiss stage. New York has a procedural rule (CPLR 3211(a)(1)) that permits early dismissal based on documentary evidence, when those documents conclusively establish an affirmative defense as a matter of law. Often such evidence includes prior judicial proceedings, deeds, wills, contracts and other legal documents. Here, however, the court dismissed Dykstra’s libel claim based primarily upon the “litany” of public stories about Dykstra’s poor reputation, including Dykstra’s autobiography, magazine articles, newspaper and online news reports, a book by the former editor of a magazine run by Dykstra, a 2017 book by Darling, Dykstra’s robust litigation history, including being the subject of 24 legal actions, and Dykstra’s prior criminal convictions and the publicity they received.

Unlike the documentary evidence often relied upon at the dismissal stage, much of this evidence was not offered for the truth of its contents (avoiding a hearsay objection), but instead to demonstrate the widespread availability of negative information about Dykstra’s character—particularly as it pertained to the subject of Darling’s story: racist, unsportsmanlike, and abusive behavior. So the news stories or the anecdotes from Dykstra’s former colleagues did not have to be truthful to support the libel-proof plaintiff defense; their mere existence was sufficient as a matter of law to establish that Dykstra’s reputation could not be further harmed by Darling’s story.

In reaching this conclusion, the court found an absence of any basis for using its limited resources to determine whether “Dykstra engaged in yet another example of bigoted behavior over thirty-years ago . . . .” Instead, the court noted that Dykstra could tell his side of the story to the public. Dykstra claimed to have enlisted Boyd and Mets legends Doc Gooden and Daryl Strawberry to dispute Darling’s story, and the court urged him to further those efforts to address any perceived harm to his reputation.

Although it is unclear whether Dykstra has taken the court up on its suggestion to use his public platform to tell his side of the story, he has used that platform to accuse Justice Kalish of having “a very flexible interpretation of the law,” and to call him a “hack judge,” to question why Darling would pick him as an enemy because, according to Dykstra, he’s “the last (bleeping) guy you’d want to pick,” to threaten Darling with “pending doom” based on some unspecified “ugly truth” about Darling’s baseball career, and to threaten to reveal dirt on Darling and Mets ownership (this last threat was part of a video posted to Twitter taken on the side of the road following a car crash in which Dykstra claims “a bunch of hillbillies” rear-ended his Uber). Who knows, if Dykstra follows through on these threats, he and Darling may find themselves on opposite sides of a libel lawsuit in the future.

On Dykstra’s lawsuit, unless he succeeds on appeal, he at least got one thing right: the case is “never going to (bleeping) trial.”

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.