.

Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Advertising

New California Class Action Targeting Ivanka Trump’s Fashion Line Tests the Limits of California’s Unfair Competition Law

March 28, 2017

by Kent J. Schmidt

Download as a PDF

Share this page

California class actions are frequently in the news, often prompted by stories or controversies that have cable news abuzz or involve new cutting-edge technology. On March 16, 2017, a class action lawsuit was filed in San Francisco against Ivanka Trump Marks, LLC.  Modern Appealing Clothing v. Ivanka Trump Marks, LLC, Cal. Sup. Ct, County of San Francisco, Case No. CGC-17-557575. The lawsuit provides an opportunity to review the basics of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), which enjoins business practices that are “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” and explore the statute’s outer limits.

The Claim Against Ivanka Trump Marks, LLC

The gravamen of the claim is that Ms. Trump’s company is using the power and prestige of her father’s position to sell her products and promote her brands, thereby unfairly competing with other women’s clothing and accessories companies. The putative class is comprised of “[a]ll women’s clothing and accessories businesses in California at any time from November 9, 2016, through the date of trial.” Modern Appealing Clothing (“MAC”), owned by the storied Ospital family, which has been in the business in San Francisco for 40 years, is the representative Plaintiff.

On behalf of the class, MAC alleges:

“Defendant Ivanka Trump and its employees and agents have, since the election, promoted defendant Ivanka Trump’s brand by exploiting the power and prestige of the White House for personal gain, including, but not limited to, piggy-backing promotion of defendant Ivanka Trump Products on appearances at executive branch and other governmental events. ¶ President Donald J. Trump and his individual and White House employees and agents have, since the election, promoted [sic] defendant Ivanka Trump brand by exploiting the power and prestige of the White House.  For example, President Donald J. Trump has condemned Nordstrom and other retailers for dropping defendant Ivanka Trump’s line. As another example, Counselor to the President Kellyanne Conway endorsed defendant Ivanka Trump’s products on February 9, 2017, in an interview on Fox News from the White House briefing room with the White House insignia visible behind her.  As another example, White House Press and Communications Director Sean Spicer has used his positions at the White House to support defendant Ivanka Trump.”

Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of ill-gotten gains as restitution as well as an injunction prohibiting future violations.

It is doubtful that this lawsuit will survive a motion to dismiss, but it presents a good case study to consider the UCL and a few of its parameters.

Is this a Real Lawsuit or “Fake” UCL Claim?

The question is whether the highly-publicized statements and tweets by President Trump, Mr. Spicer and Ms. Conway rise to the level of “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” promotional activities in violation of Section 17200. There are specific requirements for each of these three prongs, as well as limitations on the remedies that can be sought and the type of injury that must be alleged.

Unlawful: Any business practice that violates another law is “unlawful” under Section 17200.  It is not necessary that the law provide a private right of action.  This is what separates California from other jurisdictions which do not allow litigants to cite a violation of a law as a basis for a civil claim unless there is a private right of action. The best example of this is Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1148 (2003), in which a government contractor claimed that its competitor obtained a lucrative defense contract from a foreign government by engaging in bribery in violation for the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).  There is no private right of action under the FCPA.  But a violation of the FCPA is sufficient to state a claim.  (The UCL claim failed for other reasons, discussed below.) Here, the Plaintiff’s counsel never bothers to allege what law was violated.  An argument has been made that Ms. Conway’s statement violated 5 C.F.R. 2635.702 which provides: “An employee shall not use his public office for his own private gain, for the endorsement of any product, service or enterprise, or for the private gain of friends, relatives, or persons with whom the employee is affiliated in a nongovernmental capacity, including nonprofit organizations of which the employee is an officer or member, and persons with whom the employee has or seeks employment or business relations.”

Assuming that this is the law that undergirds the “unlawful” theory, and that, as many have opined, Ms. Conway violated this regulation by her comments, there is a fatal flaw in the theory.  While the corporate entity may have benefited from the publicity, there are no allegations that Ms. Conway was an agent of the company or that the company directed her to make those comments.  Other than broad and vague allegations of a conspiracy with un-named co-conspirators, the Complaint fails to tie the statements of President Trump, Mr. Spicer or Ms. Conway to the company.  The President talks about and tweets about companies that he likes (and dislikes) all the time, but those companies cannot be said to have violated any regulation by words arguably constituting an endorsement. And there is another problem. Although Korea Supply supports the concept of basing an “unlawful” claim on a federal statute or regulation, the key holding in that case was to limit the types of “restitutionary” recovery that can be obtained by a UCL plaintiff.  “Under the UCL, an individual may recover profits unfairly obtained to the extent that these profits represent monies given to the defendant or benefits in which the plaintiff has an ownership interest.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1148 (2003).  Based on this holding, even if they could tie the endorsements to the company, MAC will not be able to obtain the “restitution” remedy it seeks because the profits from the unlawful promotion are not monies that MAC or other competitors gave to Ivanka Trump Mark, LLC.  At most, the claim would be limited to injunctive relief as its sole remedy.

Unfair: The next question is whether Ivanka Trump’s company engaged in an “unfair” business practice. “Cases have employed three different criterion to determine whether a business practice is ‘unfair’ under the UCL. One states [a]n ‘unfair’ business practice occurs when that practice ‘offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers. A second rule provides the public policy which is a predicate to the action must be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions. A third holds [a]n act or practice is unfair if the consumer injury is substantial, is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition, and is not an injury the consumers themselves could reasonably have avoided.” Moran v. Prime Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 3 Cal. App. 5th 1131, 1150 (2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The best case for satisfying the unfair business practice requirement is for MAC to allege that the practice violates public policy, tethered to a regulatory provision.  Again, the difficulty is showing that Ivanka Trump Mark, LLC, through its management, employees or agents, engaged in an allegedly “unfair” business practice as opposed to merely benefiting from ill-advised comments of others.

Fraudulent: The last prong of a UCL claim appears to be weakest of the three.  The “UCL’s fraud prong generally ‘require[s] … a showing that members of the public are likely to be deceived.’ [Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 221 Cal. App. 4th 49, 81 (2013).] To establish a private party’s standing to maintain a UCL cause of action under the fraud prong, In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, held the phrase “as a result of” appearing in Business and Professions Code section 17204 “imposes an actual reliance requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a private enforcement action under the UCL’s fraud prong.” [In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th [298, 326 (2009).] Moran, 3 Cal. App. 5th at 1149-50. MAC and the class it seeks to represent – women’s clothing and accessories companies – are not deceived or misled by any act or omission of Ivanka Trump or her company.  They may contend that sales were diverted and they may be annoyed, irritated or harmed by the alleged endorsements, but that is not the same as being deceived.

This new Complaint, while it may be creative, is a reminder that, “[a]lthough the unfair competition law’s scope is sweeping, it is not unlimited.” Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 182 (1999).  Stay tuned for further developments on this case to see if the prediction that the lawsuit will not make it past the pleading stage is correct.

Related Categories:

Advertising

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.