.

Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Data Protection and Privacy

Privacy Litigation Trends – Back to the Future

October 26, 2023

by Austin T. Chambers and Deb Howitt

Download as a PDF

Share this page

Plaintiffs look to the past to take action against modern web tracking

As states rapidly enact new consumer privacy legislation, businesses have been working tirelessly to comply with extensive new data protection obligations and build out compliance programs. Despite the fact that these new state laws lack a private right of action for violations associated with online tracking and data sharing, private plaintiffs across the country have found creative workarounds, filing a wide range of novel claims alleging violations of decades-old privacy laws. These claims seek to expand the reach of these older laws to modern technologies, adding a new, dynamic layer to businesses’ privacy concerns.

Driving the explosion in litigation are a series of decisions that have given new life to claims under state and federal wiretap laws and for violation of state constitutional common law privacy rights in the context of common online technologies. As a result, private plaintiffs are increasingly bypassing the broad limitations on private rights of action common to state consumer privacy laws, and making demands that go beyond, or potentially conflict, with the requirements set out in those laws.

For now, many of these actions are relatively novel claims working through lower courts, often on preliminary motions. The causes of action and defenses continue to evolve, and there remains considerable change and uncertainty as these cases develop. However, recent trends suggest that courts are engaging in critical and nuanced evaluations of these claims in the context of popular online advertising and communications technologies.

 

What technologies are the focus of Plaintiffs’ claims?

The key technologies at issue in these cases are online advertising services, social media “pixels,” “chatbots,” and “session-replay” technologies commonly used by businesses with consumer-facing online services.

  • Online advertising, such as display advertising, retargeting, or remarketing services often involve the use of consumer profiles that are accessed and distributed among myriad companies involved in the ad personalization and bidding process.
  • Social media pixels and other integrations allow companies to connect their website with social media services to obtain insights about consumer demographics and other marketing data and to run targeted marketing campaigns on popular social media sites.
  • Chatbots are third party tools that companies add to their sites that allow customers to seek support, find products, and ask questions.
  • Session replay technologies involve the recording of user interactions on sites for usage, debugging, and similar analytical purposes, but which may involve creating a record of user data entered in form fields, or similar information.

In each case, third party providers operate these technologies and are granted access to data relating to the customer’s activity on and other interactions with the business’s online services and, in some cases, communications with the business. In the case of social media pixels, social media companies may have access to information such as the products or content that the user viewed, shopping carts, purchases, and other information revealed by ‘tags’ that companies place on their services. Social media sites then link this information to a user’s social media profile or other information the platform holds about the user, which the business can then use to obtain insights about consumer behavior and to target advertising to similar users on social media sites.

What claims are plaintiffs bringing?

To challenge companies’ use of these technologies, plaintiffs are looking to the past, bringing challenges under state and federal wiretap acts (telephone privacy), under state constitutional or common law privacy (e.g., invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion), and the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”), a relatively obscure 1987 law passed in response to the disclosure of supreme court nominee Robert Bork’s video rental history. Each of these laws permit private claims and provide for statutory damages, which may allow private individuals to bring claims without proof of actual damages.

The federal Wiretap Act (18 USC § 2511) provides a cause of action against “any person who … intentionally intercepts … or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral or electronic communication.” Similarly, California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (Cal. Pen. Code § 631(a)) “CIPA”) provides a cause of action against a person who “attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication” including anyone “who aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons” to engage in such conduct. However, both CIPA and the federal wiretap act allow such conduct with the consent of all parties to the communication.

In addition to the wiretap claims, plaintiffs have brought claims under state constitutional or common law for invasion of privacy. For example, in California a person has a cause of action where another person ‘intentionally intrudes into a place, conversation, or matter as to which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and the intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable person.’

The VPPA (18 USC § 2710) provides a cause of action against a “video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider” without authorization. While the VPPA was originally intended to address videotape rental services, the VPPA also applies to “any person engaged in the business … or deliver or prerecorded video … tapes or similar audio visual material.”

For each of these claims, plaintiffs fundamentally allege that behavioral and interaction data collected by online services reveals private information, communications, or other information protected by law. For example, in cases where defendants use online advertising or social media pixels, plaintiffs allege that these services allow the website operators, or their advertisers or social media partners, to collect detailed, private information relating to their demographics, preferences, and behaviors. For businesses with video offerings, plaintiffs further allege that the disclosure of information relating to the videos, e.g., the title, violates the VPPA. Similarly, on sites that use chatbots or session replay technologies, plaintiffs often allege these technologies result in the disclosure of protected communications.

The outcome of these claims tend to turn on several of key facts:

In all cases:

Did the plaintiff provide consent?

  • The quintessential defense to each of these claims is the plaintiff’s consent to the collection or disclosure of the information at issue. However, there remains some dispute over the elements of consent required in each case. Important open questions include the means and extent to which a plaintiff was notified of the alleged conduct (e.g., via a standalone notice or general privacy policy), or whether the plaintiff affirmatively opted-in, acknowledged the use, or if legal notices were available for review when the plaintiff used a service.

Was there actual harm?

  • Despite statutory damage provisions, there remain open questions as to whether plaintiffs can bring claims in cases where there is no injury in fact or no allegation of legally cognizable harms. The Supreme Court’s landmark Spokeo and TransUnion cases continue to develop alongside many of these claims.

For wiretap claims:

Does the technology involve the disclosure of communications content?

  • Generally, wiretap claims require the defendant to have intercepted the content of a communication, not merely information relating to the communication (e.g., number dialed, time, etc.). Wiretap laws such as CIPA also cover interception of the meaning of a communication. In the case of behavioral advertising or social media, there is considerable debate as to whether browsing metadata that reveals demographic information, usage history, or information regarding products viewed or purchased reflects a “communication.” Similarly, in cases of session replay technologies, it may be unclear whether actual communications, or mere interaction data were collected, especially where services offer redaction tools that enable operators to exclude communications content, but the redactions are not visible to the public (or in a manner sufficiently apparent at the pleading stage).

Is the party a third party?

  • Where a defendant or their agent is a party to communication, those parties generally cannot be liable under wiretap laws. Therefore, in cases where a service provider is required to provide services only on behalf of a business (i.e., subject to a services agreement and data protection agreement), parties may be able to avoid liability and dismiss claims under wiretap acts under this exception. However, where social media companies or advertisers can use data for their own purposes, it is debatable (and highly context dependent) whether the social media platform could be deemed a party to the communication.

For invasion of privacy claims:

Does the plaintiff have a reasonable expectation of privacy?

  • Foundational to all invasion of privacy claims is the defendant’s reasonable expectation that the information or communication was private. As with wiretap cases, where a business collets only general commercial information or metadata about a communication—but no actual communication—courts are less likely to find that the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Where the volume or nature of data reveals only common, or readily observable behavior, courts are also less likely to find a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, where a business collects detailed search histories or other data that collectively reflects the substance of a communication or significant amounts of information about a person, some courts have found that plaintiffs may have a reasonable expectation that such information would remain private. A defendant’s conduct can also give rise to expectations of privacy, e.g., though the provision of opt-out options, or affirmative statements that certain data would not be collected.

Was the conduct highly offensive?

  • In additional to the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the defendant’s conduct must be “highly offensive.” There is considerable debate over this element, as courts often must consider vague, and sometimes evolving, social norms. However, in cases where information collected is general commercial information or otherwise non-sensitive, courts often find that such conduct was not offensive enough to support a claim, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s reasonable belief that the information would remain private.

For VPPA claims:

Is the business is a video tape service provider?

  • The VPPA applies only to video tape service providers that are “engaged in the rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tape or similar audio visual materials.” While courts have expanded this to online streaming services and other online video platforms, courts have found that a party may not be a ‘service provider’ where they merely deliver video content (for no fee) or where the video offering is only ancillary to the business (e.g., a video on a marketing website for a consumer products company). Similarly, courts have found that providers offering live content or livestreams are not video service providers.

Is the plaintiff a “consumer”?

  • A consumer for purposes of VPPA is a “renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” Recent VPPA cases have scrutinized the nexus between plaintiffs’ relationships with the business and the video content at issue. In cases where video is neither core to the business nor the subscription or purchase transaction, courts have found that an individual is not a consumer for VPPA purposes. However, where exclusive video content or similar offerings are made to subscribers as part of a purchase, courts are more likely to find a sufficient nexus between the video content and a subscription or other commercial transaction.

Is the disclosed data “personally identifiable”?

  • The VPPA defines personal information “as information that identifies a person as having requested specific video material from the video tape service provider.” This definition is narrower than definitions under modern consumer privacy laws that extend to data that that is identifiable or linked or linkable to a person. Some data from social media services is known to link directly to user profiles that readily identify individuals, and as such may be personally identifiable. However, data that is not directly identifiable, such as anonymous user IDs (isolated from data sufficient to link to a known ID), IP addresses, and the like may not be personally identifiable for purposes of the VPPA.

How should businesses respond?

In response to the wave of cases, businesses should take steps to ensure that they review and evaluate the implementation of common web technologies, in particular those involving social media, advertising, session replay technologies, and video content. Dorsey’s team of privacy lawyers can provide advice and assistance with measures to mitigate the risks of litigation under these novel claims.

Dorsey’s privacy team will continue to monitor these cases and report on updates as courts consider these cases and critical facts continue to develop.

Related Categories:

Data Protection and Privacy

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.