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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

“Running Man” Case Trips, Falls, and Is Dismissed

June 12, 2020

by Ryan Meyer

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Just two months ago, we published a post about an Eastern District of Pennsylvania decision in the Pellegrino v. Epic Games case regarding Epic’s online battle royale video game, Fortnite. In that case, saxophonist Leo Pellegrino alleged that a Fortnite “emote” (i.e., a feature sold by Epic to players to allow their avatars to perform a particular gesture, dance, etc.) titled “Phone It In” impermissibly copied his signature dance move. The court dismissed all of Pellegrino’s claims except for false endorsement, but he voluntarily dismissed the rest of his case on April 29, 2020.

On May 29, 2020, a federal district court in Maryland granted Epic another victory by dismissing with prejudice all claims against it for its use and sale of a different emote, “Running Man.” Plaintiffs Jaylen Brantley and Jared Nickens alleged in their complaint that in 2016 they created, named, and popularized a dance called the “Running Man” and incorporated it into breaks during basketball games at the University of Maryland. The dance went viral on social media, and Brantley and Nickens encouraged others to post videos on social media of themselves performing Running Man. Running Man became even more popular after Brantley and Nickens were invited to bust their move on The Ellen Show. Despite the allegations in the their current complaint, Brantley and Nickens told noted dance aficionado Ellen DeGeneres that they copied the dance after New Jersey high school students Kevin Vincent and Jeremiah Hall, who also appeared on the show, created it, and posted it on Instagram.

Regardless, Brantley and Nickens now allege that “[t]he Running Man has become synonymous with Plaintiffs [Brantley and Nickens], who are credited with creating the dance and video that became ‘viral.’” They further allege that Fortnite’s Running Man emote is an unauthorized copy of their Running Man dance. Therefore, they asserted claims for invasion of the right of privacy/publicity (Count I), Lanham Act and common law unfair competition (Counts II and III), unjust enrichment (Count IV), Lanham Act and common law trademark infringement (Counts V and VI), Lanham Act trademark dilution (Count VII), and Lanham Act false designation of origin (Count VIII) against Epic.

Repeatedly citing Pellegrino, United States District Judge Paul W. Grimm dismissed all of Brantley and Nickens’s claims with prejudice.

First, he held that Counts I, III, IV, and VIII are preempted by the Copyright Act. The two-prong test for copyright preemption requires finding (1) that the work is within the scope of subject matter specified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 and (2) that the rights granted under state law are equivalent to the exclusive rights with the scope of federal copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 106. “Choreographic works” are specifically recognized as a copyrightable work under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) of the Copyright Act when they are fixed in a tangible medium, but copyright protection does not extend to ideas embodied in those works.

Moreover, there is an important distinction between a choreographic work—i.e., “a related series of dance movements and patterns organized into a coherent whole”—and a mere dance—i.e., “social dance steps or simple routines” like “the basic waltz step, the hustle step, the grapevine, or the second position in classical ballet”—because only the former can be protected by copyright. Although Judge Grimm concluded that Running Man falls somewhere on the spectrum between a choreographic work and a dance, he explained that this distinction ultimately did not matter since “the scope of copyright preemption is greater than the scope of copyright protection,” and Running Man is within the “general subject matter” of copyright under a choreographic work. Accordingly, Running Man meets the first prong of the copyright preemption test. Regarding the second prong, Judge Grimm determined that the plaintiffs’ claims for invasion of right of publicity/privacy, common law unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and false endorsement were equivalent to the exclusive reproduction, performance, distribution, and display rights that are exclusive to the Copyright Act. Therefore, these claims are preempted by federal copyright.

For similar reasons, Judge Grimm dismissed plaintiffs’ Lanham Act unfair completion and false designation of origin claims for being properly the subject of the Copyright Act, not the Lanham Act since they pertained to the copying of ideas or concepts and failed to allege facts indicating confusion in the market place.

Finally, Judge Grimm concluded that Brantley and Nickens failed to plausibly allege a valid trademark as required by their trademark infringement and dilution claims. Plaintiffs failed to allege that Running Man is a valid trademark that identifies a good or service as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Although plaintiffs alleged that Running Man is distinctive and immediately recognizable based on their likenesses, the court pointed out that, “as a general rule images and likenesses do not function as trademarks.” In addition, Brantley and Nickens failed to adequately allege that Running Man identifies a unique good or service, essentially arguing that Running Man is a trademark for the plaintiffs performing Running Man. This argument fails, however, because trademarks are not goods or services and cannot be used to identify themselves. Thus, all claims were dismissed with prejudice.

Brantley once again confirms that content creators, such as Epic and other video game companies, are generally allowed to put dance moves into their own work without violating publicity, privacy, trademark, or copyright laws, provided that the only thing being copied are the movements of the dance. There are limits, however. Copying the dancer’s likeness could still be a violation of the dancer’s privacy and publicity rights. In addition, context matters. Had Epic used the dance in a college basketball video game instead of a battle royale video game, this case might have been a closer call. Moreover, if a dance actually were somehow used to identify a unique good or service, then copying that dance could run afoul of the trademark laws. However, as long as content creators are only copying the latest popular dance steps and not the dancers, they should be pleased with this decision.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.