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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Data Protection and Privacy

The Demise of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the Future of Personal Data Transfers from the EU

August 20, 2020

by Ron Moscona

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In a dramatic and widely reported decision of 12 July 2020 in the case known as Schrems II (Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd), the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) invalidated the decision of the EU Commission that gave legal effect in the EU to the EU-US Privacy Shield scheme. In other words, personal data transfers from the EU to the US can no longer be lawfully undertaken in reliance on the scheme.

Intelligence services surveillance powers and the privacy of EU citizens

The decision follows a previous judgment of the same court in the same case from October 2015 (known as Schrems I) in which the Safe Harbor scheme, a predecessor of the EU-US Privacy Shield, was also invalidated by the Court.

Both decisions proceeded on the same basis, that is, that electronic surveillance programs operated by the US intelligence services under US legislation and under Presidential Executive Orders do not provide legal redress (or at least do not provide sufficient legal redress) to EU citizens whose data may be accessed unlawfully. Therefore, it was held, the schemes, which were designed to allow the free flow of personal data between the EU and the US for participating organisations, did not meet the requirements under EU law to ensure that data subjects have equivalent legal protection to their privacy rights in the US as they have in the EU.

In part, the finding of insufficient judicial redress is based on the Court’s conclusion that the constitutional protection provided in the US Constitution under the 4th Amendment (in relation to unlawful searches and seizures) is effectively only available to US individuals, whereas an EU citizen (or resident) is unlikely to have standing in a US court. Further, some of the surveillance programs are based on Executive Order 12333, which provides no judicial redress at all.

So, can data still be transferred lawfully to the US?

The decision of the CJEU raises many interesting questions but it is now a political matter for the EU and the US to resolve. In the meantime, the practical question for enterprises and institutions that rely on the flow of personal data from the EU to the US (and indeed to other countries) is how to ensure that such data flows are not disrupted.

Most companies and organisations do not rely on the EU-US Privacy Shield, as the likelihood of its invalidation by the CJEU has been long anticipated. Many rely instead on the “Standard Contractual Clauses” (“SCCs”) that have been approved by the EU Commission in a series of decisions as a lawful basis for transferring personal data to countries outside the EU.

The Court in Schrems II rejected a challenge to the validity of the EU Commission’s decisions adopting the SCCs. However, it does not follow from the decision by any means that the transfer of personal data in reliance on the SCCs remains lawful. In fact, the decision throws serious doubts on that question.

The implications of the CJEU’s decision in respect of the use of SCCs are very uncertain. What is clear is that it is the responsibility of the parties to the data transfer (the data controller who transfers the data from the EU and the party that receives the data outside the EU under the terms of the SCCs), and the responsibility of national privacy regulators in the EU member state from where the data is transferred, to ensure that the SCCs provide adequate protection to the privacy rights of the data subjects.

It is also clear from the Court’s decision that to ensure adequate protection, the SCCs (together with any additional safeguards that may be put in place) must guarantee that the level of protection that data subjects have in relation to the use of their personal data outside the EU must be equivalent to the protection they enjoy under EU law.

The Court made the point very clearly that the SCCs – which naturally do not bind national intelligence authorities in the US – cannot guarantee that personal data that is transferred to the US will not be subjected to surveillance powers without adequate judicial redress to EU data subjects. However, the Court did not say that this means that the SCCs necessarily cannot provide a lawful basis for transferring data to the US.

In what circumstances the SCCs can still provide the lawful basis for data transfers and what other “safeguards” can be put in place to ensure that data subjects enjoy an equivalent level of protection for the privacy rights are questions that were left unanswered by the Court.

What is the risk and what can be done about it?

The current position as a result of the decision in Schrems II is rather extraordinary.

EU legislation authorised the EU Commission to adopt the SCCs as a framework for lawfully transferring personal data to countries outside the EU that do not provide an adequate level of protection to privacy rights. The CJEU has determined that the decisions of the EU Commission adopting the SCCs were valid. However, at the same time, the Court held that the transfer of data in reliance on the SCCs may still be unlawful, and it is down to the parties to the transfer (and to national authorities) to determine whether the conditions are met for ensuring the transfer is lawful.

For any company based in the EU this is a highly unsatisfactory position. An organisation may have to make the difficult choice between suspending all data transfers to the US (and to other countries where national authorities may have surveillance powers without giving EU citizens sufficient legal redress), which could have serious economic consequences, or taking the risk that continuing such transfers might be held unlawful. The organisation could be open to regulatory action, investigations and legal claims by data subjects and regulators and it could risk significant potential penalties, injunctions and damages claims by data subjects.

Organisations that rely on data transfers between the EU and the US will have to develop strategies to avoid or minimise the risk.

Some may take the view that as long as national authorities in the relevant member state do not adopt a decision (in general or in specific cases) holding that the transfer of data in reliance of the SCCs is unlawful, it is reasonable to continue to rely on the SCCs. After all, they are based on valid decisions of the EU Commission. It should be noted in this regard that it has been reported that some national regulators (including in Germany and Ireland) have already expressed the view that data transfers to the US under the SCCs should probably no longer be treated as lawful given the rationale of the decision of the CJEA.

A more cautious approach may require carrying out a risk assessment and putting in place additional safeguards to the SCCs. The CJEU did not indicate what these safeguards might be. It only pointed to the fact that the relevant provisions of GDPR make reference to such “appropriate safeguards”. Until some guidance emerges, it is for each organisation in each case to consider what additional measures can be put in place, given the circumstances and the assessment of the risk of the transfer in each specific case. Such safeguards can include, for example, encryption and anonymisation of data, introducing additional contractual provisions, procedures and warranties or additional diligence that would at least minimise the risks of data being exposed to surveillance by national intelligence authorities.

Finally, organisations can seek to rely on a set of derogations under the GDPR to the rule that restricts the transfer of personal data to countries outside the EU. These derogations include, among others, transfers made with the explicit consent of the data subject, transfers that are required for the performance of contractual obligations and transfers required for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. For many good reasons, organisations historically tended not to rely on those derogations as a sole basis for international transfers of data. Following Schrems II, however, the SCCs can no longer be considered an entirely safe legal route and so in appropriate circumstances it may be better to rely on those derogation.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.