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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

Trademark Abandonment – Round Up Your Trademark Use Intentions

August 13, 2018

by Cathy Dahl

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A trademark will be deemed abandoned under Section 1127 of the Lanham Act when the mark’s use has been discontinued “with intent not to resume such use.” Proof of non-use for three consecutive years will give rise to a presumption of abandonment, which can be rebutted by evidence of plans to resume use of the mark.

What constitutes sufficient evidence of an intent to resume use of a trademark?    

In a recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the owner of the trademark COWBOY LITTLE BARREL for bourbon was unsuccessful in overturning a jury verdict of abandonment due to insufficient evidence concerning the reasons for the lack of use and plans to resume use. Allied Lomar, Inc. v. Lone Star Distillery, LLC.

According to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office records, Allied claimed first use of COWBOY LITTLE BARREL in August 1995. It obtained a registration in 2003 and filed maintenance documents in 2009 and in 2013, alleging current use of the mark in commerce at those times.

In 2015, Lone Star Distillery, LLC (now doing business as Garrison Brothers Distillery), filed a cancellation proceeding against Allied’s registration at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, triggered by a refusal of its COWBOY BOURBON trademark application. Lone Star contended that Allied had not sold bourbon under the COWBOY LITTLE BARREL trademark since 2009 and that at least one of its maintenance filings constituted fraud on the PTO. Allied then filed suit in the Western District of Texas, asserting claims of trademark infringement, false advertising, false designation of origin and unfair competition against Garrison Brothers and its sales of liquor under its COWBOY BOURBON mark.

At trial, Allied’s president testified that it had not sold product under the mark because the company specializes in old, rare and expensive whiskeys and that a lack of sales was due to a bourbon shortage. Garrison Brothers presented evidence disputing Allied’s contention, highlighting inconsistent testimony concerning Allied’s price lists. The end result was a jury verdict in favor of Garrison Brothers. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit upheld the jury verdict because Allied’s evidence amounted to “a vague, subjective intent to resume use of a mark at some unspecified future date.”

What would suffice as evidence of an intention to resume use of a mark? 

A 2010 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressing a similar issue comes to mind: The Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.

Mattel challenged an application to register CRASH DUMMIES for a line of games and playthings filed by The Crash Dummy Movie, LLC (“CDM”). Mattel based its challenge upon its common law trademark rights obtained through its predecessor-in-interest, Tyco Industries, Inc. Tyco owned several trademark registrations for CRASH DUMMIES trademarks for a variety of products, which the PTO cancelled in 2000 for failure to make required maintenance filings. Tyco sold toys under the CRASH DUMMIES marks through at least 1994 and entered into several licenses for the use of the marks for a broad range of products.

In 1995, CDM entered into an option agreement with Tyco to produce a motion picture based on the toys sold under the CRASH DUMMIES marks. That option expired in 1996 and Tyco declined to enter into another option agreement with CDM. Tyco subsequently experienced financial difficulties and began negotiations with Mattel for an acquisition. In 1997, Tyco assigned its trademark portfolio, including the CRASH DUMMIES marks, to Mattel. Due to the size of the acquisition, the two businesses did not fully integrate until late 2004 or early 2005.

Beginning in 1998, Mattel worked on developing a new line of toys under the CRASH DUMMIES marks, including researching, developing, and testing the new toys as early as 2001. It ultimately reintroduced the toys into the market in December 2003. In March 2003, CDM filed an application for CRASH DUMMIES for games and playthings, which Mattel opposed. The only issue was whether Mattel had common law trademark rights in the CRASH DUMMIES marks sufficient to challenge CDM’s application. The TTAB concluded that Mattel had rebutted the presumption of abandonment of its common law trademark rights by showing “reasonable grounds for the suspension and plans to resume use in the reasonably foreseeable future when conditions requiring suspension abate.”

Mattel was able to rebut the presumption of abandonment arising from the period of non-use through the testimony of its marketing manager and business records that demonstrated product development activities in an effort to actively retool the CRASH DUMMIES toy line.

Practical business applications:

  1. Keep careful and specific business records about market research, product development plans and relevant business negotiations pertaining to an intent to resume use of a mark if there are periods of non-use of a trademark.
  2. Make no public statements about the permanent cessation of use of any trademark unless there is an absolute intent to abandon trademark rights. If plans are uncertain or there is a possibility of resumption, better to characterize any public announcement of the discontinuance of product sales as a hiatus or otherwise temporary or interim.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.