.

Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

Trademark Practice Tip: How to Settle a Trademark Opposition Proceeding and Obtain Judgment Against the Applicant After an Application is Abandoned

September 13, 2019

by Sandra Edelman

Download as a PDF

Share this page

Most opposition proceedings in the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the USPTO settle before final judgment, often based on a negotiated settlement agreement requiring the abandonment of the opposed application. In these circumstances, will judgment be entered against the applicant and in favor of opposer in the proceeding? It depends on how the settlement agreement is phrased, according to a recent decision of the TTAB on reconsideration in Kathy Michael d/b/a Cedar Cove Inn v. Debbie Macomber, Inc., Opp. No. 91239859 (non-precedential). Unless the settlement agreement specifically states that the opposer expressly consents to the abandonment of the application, judgment will be entered against the applicant.

The opposer in Macomber entered into a settlement agreement with the applicant that included a number of substantive provisions concerning ongoing use and registration of the parties’ respective marks. With respect to the opposed application, the agreement specified: “Express Withdrawal of Application. [Applicant] shall, by December 14, 2018, expressly withdraw pending U.S. Trademark Application No. 87586893.” The Agreement did not include a specific provision as to how the opposition proceeding itself would be resolved.

After the settlement agreement was executed, the applicant filed a motion to abandon its application without opposer’s written consent. Three days later, the TTAB entered judgment against the applicant, the opposition was sustained, and the application refused. So far so good for opposer.

But the next day, the applicant filed a “corrected” motion to abandon the application, this time including an allegation of opposer’s consent based on the signed settlement agreement. The Board then issued an order noting the corrected motion to abandon the application with opposer’s written consent and dismissed the opposition without prejudice. Not so good for opposer.

So the opposer filed a request for reconsideration, arguing that the Board had erred in accepting applicant’s assertion in the “corrected” motion that the signed settlement agreement constituted the required written consent to abandonment of the application that would result in a dismissal of the opposition without prejudice. On take three for the TTAB, the Board agreed that it had indeed erred by dismissing the opposition without prejudice in response to the “corrected” motion.

According to the Board, Trademark Rule 2.135 provides that after an opposition has been commenced, if the applicant files a written abandonment of its application “without the written consent of every adverse party to the proceeding, judgment shall be entered against the applicant.” The Board agreed with opposer that at no point in the settlement agreement did it provide its express consent to withdrawal of the application. According to the Board, signing the settlement agreement just “means that the parties consent to settling their dispute on the terms set forth in the agreement.”

The Board further rejected applicant’s argument that the reciprocal promises included in the settlement agreement should be construed as a consent to the withdrawal, even though the settlement agreement did in fact provide for the withdrawal of the application. In other words, just including terms in a settlement agreement requiring the applicant to withdraw the opposed application -- but without also specifying either that opposer consents to the withdrawal or that the parties agree that the opposition will be withdrawn instead of being sustained -- will not be considered the equivalent to express consent by opposer that will lead to a dismissal of the opposition without prejudice.

Here are the takeaways from the Board’s decision on reconsideration:

  • If an applicant wants to withdraw its application and not have judgment entered against it in the proceeding, the settlement agreement must specifically provide that the withdrawal will be with the express consent of opposer
  • One way to ensure that the parties mutually understand how an application will be abandoned is to attach an exhibit with the form of abandonment (and exact language) agreed to
  • If an opposer wants to have judgment entered against the applicant, silence in a settlement agreement about whether consent will be provided to the abandonment of the application will be construed against the applicant, and opposer will be entitled to judgment sustaining the opposition.

Related Categories:

Trademarks,

TTAB

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.