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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

Twombly at the TTAB – Abandonment Allegations Found Sufficient

January 31, 2019

by Kaleb McNeely

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The U.S. Supreme Court’s blockbuster rulings in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal represented a major shift in federal pleading standards. Resolution of motions to dismiss frequently turns on whether a complaint meets Twombly’s so-called “plausibility” standard. In the context of a motion to dismiss a petition for cancellation of a trademark registration, however, not much appears to have changed since Twombly and Iqbal, at least in the context of a claim of abandonment. Late last year, in Lewis Silkin LLP v. Firebrand LLC, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board denied a motion to dismiss, holding that an allegation that a trademark owner is not using a mark with its goods and services, and has no intent to resume use, is legally sufficient to plead an abandonment claim. Notably, the Board reiterated its position that the “the same pleading standard for abandonment claims has been in effect since the 1989 implementation of the [Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988].”

Is the Board simply ignoring Twombly? And can it really do that? The answer to the latter is certainly no – indeed, the Board noted that it follows the “federal standard of notice pleading,” including the plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal. Whether the Board is properly applying Twombly is a closer question, one that probably will not be definitively answered until the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit weighs in on the pleading standard for cancellation claims.

In the Lewis Silkin proceeding, Respondent Firebrand moved to dismiss a petition for cancellation of its registration for the mark FIREBRAND for a “newsletter dealing with brand and product development” and “business consultation services.” The cancellation petition pleads merely that “[o]n information and belief, Respondent is not using Respondent’s Mark on or in connection with Respondent’s Goods and Services with no intent to resume such use.” Under the Lanham Act, a mark is deemed to be “abandoned” when its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Applying that statutory definition, the Board held that “an abandonment claim must plead nonuse, which is use that has been discontinued, plus ‘intent not to resume such use.’”

Firebrand argued that Lewis Silkin’s mere recitation of the statutory elements is insufficient to meet the Iqbal/Twombly standard for pleadings. That standard requires that a complaint “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and cautions that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” While Firebrand seems to have a point, the Board did not agree. Rather, it observed that the “much-quoted reference to ‘threadbare’ recitals does not establish a per se pleading standard” and, quoting Iqbal, stated that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” In other words, “while the Iqbal/Twombly standard applies to all civil complaints, the Supreme Court makes clear that there is flexibility in application of the standard.”

The Board then noted that, while the Federal Circuit has not applied the Iqbal/Twombly standard to abandonment claims, its application of that standard to pleadings of patent infringement is “instructive,” as the Federal Circuit has repeatedly denied motions to dismiss that seek overly-detailed pleading. The Board also referenced three previous cases in which it had occasion to apply the Iqbal/Twombly standard to abandonment claims. In each of those cases, the Board held that the Iqbal/Twombly standard did not require more than the traditional pleading of nonuse plus intent not to resume. Finally, the Board distinguished its pre-Iqbal decision in Otto Int’l Inc. v. Otto Kern Gmbh because in that case, the petition to cancel, among other things, failed to allege that the respondent had discontinued use of its mark with an intent not to resume use. By contrast, in Lewis Silkin, the Petitioner’s “abandonment claim is not merely a formulaic recitation of the elements of the claim, because . . . the allegations of nonuse plus intent serve both to describe the claim and to describe the necessary facts to support the claim.”

The Board did provide some clues as to the policy rationale for its arguably questionable application of the Iqbal/Twombly standard to cancellation claims. Specifically, the Board stated that it saw no purpose in requiring detailed pleading requirements for an abandonment claim, particularly in light of the fact that there is no list of activities that always show trademark use, and actual intent not to resume use “also must relate to the use in commerce of the mark.” The Board was also “reluctant to see pleadings devolve into wrangling over whether specific factual allegations offered to demonstrate nonuse and intent not to resume use are sufficient to support the abandonment claim,” as “matters addressing what activities constitute use in commerce under the Trademark Act are best, and traditionally, left to trial.” The Board further remarked that any concerns about an increase in unwarranted abandonment claims could be addressed by participation in discovery conferences, the imposition of sanctions, and the issuance of precedential orders.

Although not explicitly touched on by the Board, a less stringent pleading standard for abandonment claims makes some sense in view of the fact that evidence of lack of intent to resume use will generally only be in the possession of the mark owner. As such, it would be unrealistic to expect a petitioner for cancellation to know and plead all the facts necessary to prevail on an abandonment claim. Perhaps this is what the Board was getting it when it noted that Iqbal requires “the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense” in applying the Iqbal/Twombly standard. Whether the Board is ultimately right – and whether its standard for cancellation claims passes muster under Iqbal and Twombly – will have to await a decision by the Federal Circuit or, better yet, the Supreme Court. Until that happens, however, cancellation petitioners need only plead that a trademark owner is not using a mark with its goods and services, and has no intent to resume use to survive a motion to dismiss.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.