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Uncle Sam Weighs In: the DOJ Says Training AI on Your NYT Subscription Is Totally Fine

November 17, 2026

by Kaleb McNeely

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While various titans of AI industry have recently sounded the alarm and suggested AI development should slow down, the U.S. federal government continues to champion AI. Now the U.S. Department of Justice has waded into a civil litigation about whether OpenAI can hoover up the entire internet (including every New York Times article ever written) to train ChatGPT without paying a licensing fee. On September 1, 2026, the DOJ filed a Statement of Interest in the sprawling multidistrict litigation captioned In re: OpenAI, Inc. Copyright Infringement Litigation, essentially telling a federal judge in Manhattan: Hey, we’ve got some thoughts about this whole AI-training-as-copyright-infringement thing. Spoiler alert—we think it’s fine.

Here’s the background: The New York Times (and a bunch of book authors and publishers) sued OpenAI, claiming that training large language models (“LLMs”) on their copyrighted works—without permission or payment—violates the Copyright Act. The plaintiffs argue that OpenAI made unauthorized copies of millions of articles, fed them into the algorithmic meat grinder, and emerged with a product that can now compete with those very same works in the marketplace.

OpenAI’s response? “We're not republishing your stuff; we're teaching a computer to understand language. Totally different. Also, fair use.” And now the United States has weighed in—not as a party to the case, but under 28 U.S.C. § 517, a statute that lets the DOJ file statements of interest in any federal case in which it has an “interest.”

The DOJ’s statement opens with a not-so-subtle reminder that artificial intelligence is now a matter of national security. The DOJ warns that AI helps analyze intelligence, enhance weapons systems, and provide battlefield recommendations—and if the U.S. hamstrings its own AI industry with overly aggressive copyright enforcement, we’re basically handing the keys to our adversaries. The government also points out that requiring licensing for AI training would create an oligopoly—only the biggest tech companies could afford the fees, and legacy media outlets like the New York Times would rake in subsidies while indie publishers get shut out. Meanwhile, the people who use LLMs to create art, write stories, or analyze data would be stuck in a world where only Big Tech and Big Media get to play.

Now for the legal part: the actual copyright analysis. The Copyright Act grants authors exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute their works. But it also includes a critical exception called “fair use,” which allows certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted material without permission. Fair use is designed to prevent copyright from stifling the very creativity which that law is designed to foster. Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists four factors courts must consider when determining whether a use is fair: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount used; and (4) the effect on the market for the original work. No single factor is dispositive—courts must weigh them all together.

The DOJ’s position? Training AI models is exceedingly transformative—so transformative, in fact, that it’s a slam-dunk fair use. The first fair-use factor asks whether the secondary use adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, or whether it merely supersedes the objects of the original creation. The more transformative the use, the more likely it is fair.

The government argues that copying New York Times articles to train an LLM is transformative— “spectacularly so.” Why? Because the purpose of the copying isn’t to distribute the articles to readers—it’s to teach a machine to recognize statistical patterns in language. The LLM uses the text not to duplicate the work's expressive content, but to learn vocabulary, syntax, and how words relate to each other. The output—an AI that can translate languages, edit emails, write skits, or answer complex questions—is, in the DOJ’s opinion, “undoubtedly highly transformative.” The DOJ analogizes to Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 593 U.S. 1, 35 (2021), where the Supreme Court held that Google’s copying of Java code to create Android was fair use because it allowed programmers to use their existing skills in a new platform. If that was transformative, the government argues, then using copyrighted text to build an entirely new type of intelligent system is even more so.

The DOJ also argues that the fourth factor—the effect on the market for the original work—weighs in favor of a fair use finding. The DOJ asserts that training an LLM doesn't substitute for New York Times articles in any meaningful sense. Training is an internal process that doesn't “reveal” copyrighted content to the public—it just creates a tool that can understand language. Even if some LLM outputs happen to compete with journalism (like when someone asks ChatGPT to summarize the news), those outputs aren't “substantially similar” to the original articles unless they actually reproduce protected expression.

To drive the point home, the DOJ offers a hypothetical: Joan Didion once said she learned to write by typing out Ernest Hemingway’s stories to see how the sentences worked. The DOJ contends that, under plaintiffs’ logic, Didion would have owed Hemingway royalties every time she published an article, because her training process and her creative output were “all one use.” But as the government dryly observes, to make anyone pay specifically for the use of a book each time they later draw upon it when writing new things in new ways would be unthinkable.

The DOJ’s message is clear: training AI models on copyrighted text is fair use, full stop. It’s transformative, it doesn’t substitute for the original works, and blocking it would undermine the very purpose of copyright law—to promote “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

Whether the court agrees remains to be seen. But one thing is certain: this case is about far more than whether OpenAI owes the New York Times a check. It’s about the future of creativity, innovation, and how American law will approach the next wave of technological progress. And if nothing else, it’s a reminder that even in the age of AI, the messiest legal battles still come down to a 50-year-old statute and a bunch of lawyers arguing about what “transformative” means.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.