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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Copyrights

Usher’s Still in the Clear in Copyright Suit

January 3, 2017

by Jonathan Montcalm

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usherThe Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the dismissal on summary judgment of copyright infringement claims brought by Daniel Marino (not that Dan Marino) against Usher and nineteen other defendants in Marino v. Usher.  The decision underscores the bedrock principle that joint authors cannot sue their co-authors for copyright infringement and serves as a cautionary tale for joint authors, illustrating how not to vindicate their rights when their joint work has been licensed without their authorization.

Marino was part of a songwriting trio with defendants Dante Barton and William Guice that co-wrote a song called “Club Girl” in 2001. Barton successfully shopped the song to the music industry, and landed a licensing deal with Usher’s representatives.  “Club Girl” was re-worked with Marino’s assistance, recorded, renamed “Bad Girl” and released to the public on Usher’s 2004 album “Confessions.”

As the district court noted, Marino’s problems arose from entrusting the trio’s business affairs to Dante Barton. When Mr. Barton copyrighted “Club Girl,” he did not include Marino as an author.  And when Mr. Barton negotiated the licensing agreement with Usher, Marino was named only as a musician, not as a songwriter.  So when “Bad Girl” was released, Marino was not credited as a songwriter, and he never received any songwriting royalties.

After waiting several years, Marino sued Usher, the other members of the songwriting trio and seemingly every other entity affiliated in any way with “Bad Girl,” asserting myriad claims including direct, vicarious and contributory infringement.  He also sought an accounting and a constructive trust.  Ultimately, all the causes of action against all of the defendants were dismissed on various grounds at various times.  Marino appealed all of these orders, in addition to many other unappealable orders of the district court.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is surprising that the case lasted as long as it did, because Marino admitted from the start that he, Barton and Guice were joint authors of “Club Girl.”  As a joint author, Marino could not sue Barton or Guice for copyright infringement.  And it follows that there could be no vicarious or contributory infringement by the other defendants in the absence of an underlying direct infringement.  These principles are straightforward, and the district court called Marino’s arguments to the contrary “absurd.”

Also, as a joint author, Marino’s consent was not required for Barton to license the song to Usher.  Contrary to Marino’s claims, the licensing of “Club Girl” to Usher on an exclusive basis without Marino’s consent did not invalidate the license; rather, it transformed it into a non-exclusive license.  Because Usher and his representatives were operating under a valid license and within its scope, they could not be liable for any direct infringement.  The Court also found that Marino himself granted an implied license by assisting Usher and his representatives in creating “Bad Girl” from “Club Girl.”

Finally, although Barton was legally permitted to license “Club Girl” without Marino’s consent, he still would have been required to account to Marino for any profits earned from licensing “Club Girl.”  But Marino’s accounting and constructive trust claims were not properly pleaded, so they were preempted by the Copyright Act.  Marino based his accounting and constructive trust claims on the alleged underlying infringement.  By doing so, he subsumed those claims within his infringement claims, which led to their preemption.

The lesson here, and what Marino could have done (and what he belatedly tried to do) was to assert accounting and constructive trust claims not based on the underlying infringement, but rather based on the profits earned by Guice and Barton from licensing “Club Girl.”   These claims would not have run afoul of the laws applicable to joint authorship because they would not have challenged the basis for Guice and Barton earning profits from “Club Girl” in the first place, but instead would have asserted Marino’s valid right to share in those profits.

There may have been practical reasons why Marino did not choose this course.  The accounting and constructive trust claims could not have been brought against the deep-pocketed (and famous) defendants, because licensees have no duty to account to joint authors for lost profits earned by the joint authors with whom they contract.  Also, state law accounting and constructive trust claims would not have provided the same potential for the recovery of attorneys’ fees.  But these decisions harmed Marino even more in the end.  Due to the frivolity of his claims, he was assessed over one million dollars in defendants’ attorneys’ fees (an amount that was eventually reduced by ninety percent due to his financial condition).

Going forward, joint authors who feel wronged by their co-authors would be wise to understand the broad scope of permissible activities in which joint authors can engage with respect to the joint work, and the restrictions inherent in seeking to right those wrongs through the Copyright Act, as opposed to more traditional remedies.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.