.

Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Licensing

Whataburger v. What-A-Burger #13 – A battle for trademark rights in North Carolina, and potential defenses for junior trademark users

July 29, 2024

by John Mixon

Download as a PDF

Share this page

Allegations Against What-A-Burger #13

Whataburger has once again found itself in the news over a lawsuit it filed over naming rights against a long-standing East Coast burger establishment for its purported infringement of the WHATABURGER trademark. On June 11, 2024, Whatabrands LLC, the Texas-based burger establishment, sued What-A-Burger #13, Inc., a North Carolina-based burger establishment, based on its use of the mark “What-A-Burger #13.”

According to Whataburger’s complaint, it was founded in 1950 in Corpus Christi, Texas as a single location hamburger stand, but has since expanded its operations to over 1,000 restaurants in 16 states, with its rate of expansion increasing significantly since 2020. But burgers is not all that Whataburger offers. It also sells condiments, sauces, and other food items under the WHATABURGER mark in more than 5,000 grocery stores across 25 states and Mexico. In other words, Whataburger alleges it has garnered significant goodwill in its WHATABURGER mark, for which it first obtained a federal registration in 1957. With respect to What-A-Burger #13, the complaint alleges that, since no earlier than 1969, the North Carolina burger establishment has offered goods and services under the name and trademark “What-A-Burger #13” that are identical to those Whataburger offers—namely, restaurant services and food products—in connection with two North Carolina locations and a food truck. Critically, Whataburger alleges that What-A-Burger #13’s use of the mark began more than a decade after Whataburger registered its mark.

Whataburger often receives publicity about expansion into additional states and, since 2022, this publicity has included speculation about Whataburger expanding into North Carolina. While that has yet to officially occur, in April 2024 Whataburger publicly announced its plans to expand its restaurant footprint into North Carolina in 2025. Whataburger began plotting its expansion into North Carolina as early as 2022. Pursuant to this plan, Whataburger reached out to What-A-Burger #13 in October 2022 to discuss its anticipated expansion and a likelihood of confusion between the entities, which resulted in the parties entering into a coexistence agreement in May 2023.

Under the coexistence agreement, What-A-Burger #13 was permitted to use the What-A-Burger #13 mark solely in connection with their existing locations and single food truck “in limited ways.” However, Whataburger alleges that days before the coexistence agreement was signed, What-A-Burger #13 secretly formed a separate LLC called WAB #13, LLC “to circumvent the purpose and intention of” the agreement. According to Whataburger, the formation of WAB #13, as well as What-A-Burger #13’s use of its food truck, constituted breaches of the agreement. Based on these alleged events, Whataburger filed suit against What-A-Burger #13, its related entities and affiliates, and its owner, Zeb Bost, alleging federal trademark infringement, federal and common law unfair competition, breach of contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.

What-A-Burger #13’s Response

Although What-A-Burger #13 has not yet filed an answer or otherwise formally responded to the complaint, the law firm representing it provided the following statement:

What-A-Burger is a small family business that originally opened in in the 1950s in Kannapolis North Carolina. Now in its third generation of ownership by the Bost family, Zeb Bost, who is the grandchild of one of the founders operates two What-A-Burger restaurants in Stanly and Cabarrus Counties. Starting in 1970, the Bost family entered into an agreement with the then-owner of WhatABurger out of Texas that it would operate without interference in Stanly and Cabarrus Counties. The Texas company broke that agreement in 2022. Now, after being in business for seventy years, What-A-Burger’s future is being threatened by this large national retailer, and the Bost family is being victimized by big money interests.

The law firm’s response raises two noteworthy legal issues and potential defenses for What-A-Burger #13: (1) the assertion that What-A-Burger #13 opened in the 1950s belies the allegations in the complaint and gives rise to a potential good faith carveout for use of the mark, and (2) the assertion that Whataburger and What-A-Burger #13 entered into an agreement in 1970 under which Whataburger would not interfere with What-A-Burger #13’s operations in Stanly and Cabarrus Counties gives rise to a potential breach of contract counterclaim. In fact, as to the first point, the Mooresville-South Iredell Chamber of Commerce’s website states that What-A-Burger #13 was founded in 1956—one year prior to Whataburger’s federal registration for the WHATABURGER mark. As What-A-Burger expanded, each new location was named sequentially. What-A-Burger opened its first location in 1956 and its thirteenth location, What-A-Burger #13, in 1969. It will be interesting to see how What-A-Burger #13 claims that the current entity is the successor in interest to the rights commencing in 1956 and how it accounts for the variation in numbering.

Analysis of What-A-Burger #13’s Potential Defenses as a Junior User

We have seen similar situations play out in the courts before. A national brand with a federally registered trademark discovers that a smaller company is operating under the same or a similar name in a limited geographic region and, in some fashion, aggressively asserts its rights under the Lanham Act. Indeed, Whataburger itself did this with another geographically remote burger establishment using the Whataburger name in Virginia more than two decades ago.

When this situation arises though, it is important to focus on the purpose of trademark law: trademarks exist to aid consumers in identifying and differentiating between brands. They allow trademark owners to protect their goodwill through the exclusive control over the use of their unique mark. When someone uses a confusingly similar name without authorization it could lead to consumer confusion regarding the products or services offered by the junior user and the affiliation or sponsorship of the senior user with those products or services. This would allow the junior user to unjustly benefit from the goodwill established by the first user in association with the mark. Thus, courts assessing trademark infringement focus on the likelihood of consumer confusion.

Notably, when two parties are using similar marks in geographically remote areas, concurrent use may be permissible under certain circumstances without the junior user being considered an infringer. One such circumstance arises where the use of the mark by the senior and junior users are confined to geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the senior user will expand its use into the junior user’s markets, so that no consumer confusion is possible, then the subsequent user is permitted to continue use of the mark concurrently. This is known as the Dawn Donut rule and is still widely accepted, including in the Fourth Circuit, where the Middle District of North Carolina is located. Importantly, this rule only applies where the senior user is not likely to expand its use of the trademark into the geographic area in which the junior user is using the trademark because without operating in the same area, there is no likelihood of consumer confusion.

Another circumstance under which a junior user will not be considered an infringer is where (1) the junior user adopted the trademark without knowledge of the senior user’s earlier use, and (2) the junior user (or those in privity with it) has continuously used the trademark since before the senior user registered the trademark. This defense is available under Section 1115(b)(5) of the Lanham Act, and only applies to the area in which the junior use proves its continuous prior use.

Under the facts alleged by Whataburger, it is clear that the court would find that the Dawn Donut rule does not apply because of Whataburger’s planned expansion into North Carolina. Although currently Whataburger is not operating in North Carolina, making What-A-Burger #13 a geographically remote junior user, Whataburger has clear plans to expand into North Carolina based on its own announced plans, and the discussions it has had with What-A-Burger #13. Thus, Whataburger is highly likely to expand into What-A-Burger #13’s market and the Dawn Donut rule would not apply.

Though the Dawn Donut rule would not apply, What-A-Burger #13 should or could have a strong argument that it is not infringing Whataburger’s mark under Section 1115(b)(5) of the Lanham Act. Whataburger has not alleged that What-A-Burger #13 knew of its use of the mark in Texas prior to its adoption of the mark and there is no indication that it did. Moreover, it appears that What-A-Burger #13 has been using the mark since before Whataburger registered it. While Whataburger alleges that it registered its mark in 1957 and What-A-Burger #13 has been using the mark since no earlier than 1969, What-A-Burger #13’s statement and the Mooresville-South Iredell Chamber of Commerce’s website indicate that the owners of What-A-Burger #13 opened their first location under the “What-A-Burger” name in 1956. Therefore, What-A-Burger #13 has a strong argument that it has been operating in North Carolina since prior to Whataburger’s trademark registration. Assuming What-A-Burger #13 has sufficient proof of its earlier operation, it would likely succeed in asserting a defense under Section 1115(b)(5).

What-A-Burger #13’s Potential Counterclaim

In addition to asserting a defense under Section 1115(b)(5), it is likely based on What-A-Burger #13’s statement that it could assert a counterclaim against Whataburger for breach of contract. Assuming that the parties did, in fact, enter into a contract in the 1970s under which Whataburger agreed not to interfere in North Carolina in Stanly and Cabarrus Counties, then What-A-Burger #13 may have a claim that Whataburger breached this agreement by planning to expand into North Carolina.

Conclusion

This case is still in its infancy and the facts still need significant development, but it does serve as a cautionary reminder to trademark registrants seeking to expand into new geographical areas that the mere fact that its mark is registered does not give it carte blanche to enjoin any and all uses of similar marks. It also serves as a reminder to junior users that there are important exceptions to trademark priority that may be applicable to them to protect any goodwill they have established. Ultimately, nationwide protection is only available to federal trademark registrants, but the law protects good faith junior users to the extent of their continuous use. Therefore, trademark registrants should be careful to investigate the facts surrounding a junior user’s use of a mark before aggressively asserting any infringement claims.

Related Categories:

Licensing,

Trademarks

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.