Data Protection and Privacy
EU Court Strikes Down Security Legislation Over Privacy Concerns
In a decision published on 21 December 2016, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) invalidated legislation in two EU member states – the UK and Sweden – requiring telecommunication operators to retain users’ traffic and location data for 12 months and giving access to that data to intelligence, security and criminal investigation authorities. The ECJ criticised the UK and Swedish legislation as imposing “general and indiscriminate” data retention requirements which it said were incompatible with EU law. Similar considerations led the ECJ in 2014 to invalidate an EU directive that also required a 12 month retention period for communications data and the same concerns played a key part in the invalidation by the ECJ, in October 2015, of the Safe Harbor scheme for the transfer of personal data from the EU to the U.S. (now replaced with the new EU-US Privacy Shield). The EU court ruled that member states’ legislation imposing data retention obligations on telecom operators must define specific conditions for a retention requirement which must be supported by objective evidence before retention obligations can be imposed in specific cases. At the same time the court acknowledged that in some cases more general retention requirements could be justified, for example, based on geographical criteria (such as the retention of communications data of users who recently visited a war zone or other area generally associated with terrorist activity). The ECJ held that access by security agencies to the communications data must be limited to what is “strictly necessary” and that general access to all traffic and location data, even if it can be useful for preventing serious crime, is more than what is ‘strictly necessary’. For the objective of fighting crime, the court held, access can, as a general rule, be granted only to the data of individuals suspected of planning, committing or having committed a serious crime or of being implicated in one way or another in such a crime and, except in extreme urgency, must be subject to the prior oversight of the courts. The ECJ also ruled that persons affected must be notified that their data has been retained and accessed “as soon as that notification is no longer liable to jeopardise the investigations being undertaken by those authorities”. The ECJ’s decision raises serious practical obstacles to governments hoping to utilise readily available communications data for purposes of national security and crime prevention. The decision coincides with the legislation coming into force in the UK which, among other things, replaces the provisions on retention of communications data and access to that data that were struck down by the ECJ. The new legislation introduces a more comprehensive scheme incorporating many new procedures and safeguards for the protection of privacy. Fresh challenges, however, may now be brought against the new legislation which will have to be assessed against the standards set out by the ECJ.
January 19, 2017
by Ron Moscona
Patents
Could the EU Unified Patent Court Start Working in December 2017?
The Preparatory Committee charged with the implementation of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) announced on 16 January 2017 that it anticipates that the UPC agreement would come into force in December 2017, at which point it is assumed the court will open for business. The announcement coincides with a speech by Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, signaling that the UK will not seek to continue its participation in the European single market after it leaves the EU. The speech has been received as the first clear announcement by the UK Government that it expects negotiations with the EU to result in a “hard” Brexit, even though the Prime Minister also expressed the Government’s desire to enter into a comprehensive free trade deal with the EU that would allow tariff-free access to the single market for British businesses and possible other sector-specific special arrangements. Much debate has taken place since the Brexit referendum in June 2016 on the question of whether the UPC could become reality notwithstanding the UK’s anticipated break from the EU. The UK Government’s official statements over the past few months suggest that participation in the UPC system does not depend on EU membership and the UK announced that it would ratify the UPC agreement later this year. However, it is still difficult to see how Brexit (particularly the hard version now envisaged by the Government) could be reconciled with continued British participation in the UPC system. For one thing, the UPC agreement is based on the supremacy of EU law and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU as its final arbitrar. PM May made it clear several times that Brexit means that the UK will no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. It is possible that the Government would be willing to make an exception insofar as European Patents are concerned, although this would seem to be a constitutional fudge. In any event, even if Britain is willing to accept the supremacy of EU law and the jurisdiction of the ECJ in relation to European Patents (and the jurisdiction of an EU court system within its borders presiding, effectively, over all patent matters), the other EU member states that signed up to the UPC agreement still have to agree as well. The UPC agreement will come into force if and when it is ratified by the UK and Germany (it has already been ratified by 11 other EU member states including France which is a required party). Given that the agreement includes the UK hosting the important pharma and life science section of the Court’s Central Division, which is envisaged to be based in London, other member states may see the country’s participation in the UPC as a prize for the UK. Given the UK’s apparent desire to see the system becoming reality, and to continue its participation after Brexit, EU member states may use this issue as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the UK. Germany may decide therefore to delay its ratification of the UPC agreement until a final deal on Brexit (and on the new trading arrangements between the UK and the EU) is struck. A different question might arise if both Germany and the UK ratify the agreement. The UPC agreement was open for participation only by EU member states. It is silent on the question of what happens when a party leaves the EU. If the agreement is indeed ratified before the UK leaves the EU, the question of what happens on the day after will be one more item on the list of issues for Brexit negotiations. Notwithstanding the announcement of the Preparatory Committee, therefore, it remains somewhat premature to assume that the UPC will actually open up for business at the end of this year.
January 18, 2017
by Ron Moscona
Copyrights
Of Klingons and Copyrights: Trekkie Fan Film Hits Fair Use Flameout
A Star-Trek fan-film is boldly headed to a jury trial to determine whether Axanar Productions—the company behind the fan-film—is liable for copyright infringement. Paramount Pictures and CBS Studios sued Axanar Productions in December 2015 after it created a 20 minute fan-film that was based in the Star Trek universe, and to stop the company's planned feature length follow-up. The dispute started after Axanar Productions created and released a 20 minute "mockumentary" in 2014 called Prelude to Axanar. Axanar spent over $100,000 that it raised through crowdfunding to create the short and upon release, it was a big success. Due to the success of Prelude, Axanar Productions was able to raise over $1,000,000 through crowdfunding to fund the production of a feature length follow up. It would have been the highest budget for a piece of fan-fiction ever. The funds were raised and production was underway, but the lawsuit changed everything. Movie studios often let fan-fiction proceed without legal action. The projects are usually supported by the most hardcore fans of the studios’ projects, so it may not serve their interests to shut them down and potentially alienate fans. Paramount and CBS decided that the chance they would alienate some fans should not stop them from enforcing their copyrights against Axanar Productions. Both parties filed summary judgment motions, but it was Axanar’s shields that took a serious phaser blast. The Hon. Gary Klausner of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ruled that the case will proceed to trial and Axanar Productions cannot assert fair use. Judge Klausner found all four fair use factors weighed (heavily) in favor of Paramount and CBS. One problem for Axanar Productions that appeared in multiple factors was that, “Defendants intentionally use elements from the Star Trek Copyrighted Works to createworks that stay true to Star Trek canon down to excruciating details.” Opinion at 11. In other words, Axanar Production’s fidelity to the existing—and copyrighted—Star Trek canon ultimately may have been its undoing. The jury will still decide whether the projects at issue have “subjective substantial similarity” that would render Axanar Productions liable for copyright infringement. As Judge Klausner said, “If the jury finds subjective substantial similarity, the Axanar Works are rightfully considered derivative works of the Star Trek Copyrighted Works. Rejection of Defendants’ fair use defense is consistent with copyright’s very purpose because derivatives are an important economic incentive to the creation of originals.” Opinion at 13 (case citations omitted). Stay tuned to see how this unique copyright dispute is resolved in the next episode.
January 17, 2017
by Case Collard
Trademarks
Another IP Lesson from Bikini Bottom: What "The Krusty Krab" Teaches Us About Trademark Protection for Fictional Places
In a previous post we discussed what SpongeBob SquarePants can teach us about trademark licensing. Now, more IP lessons are bubbling up from the fathoms below thanks to our absorbent, yellow and porous friend. This time, we learn about how fictional places—such as the famed underwater greasy spoon, “The Krusty Krab”—can be protected under the Lanham Act. Nautical nonsense, you say? Before you tell me to drop on the deck and flop like a fish, let me explain. Viacom owns various copyrights and trademarks associated with “SpongeBob SquarePants,” the wildly popular animated TV series that airs on the Nickelodeon Network. In 1999, “The Krusty Krab” was introduced in one of the espisodes as the fast food restaurant owned and operated by Mr. Krabs, the thrifty crustacean and slave driver employer of SpongeBob, who serves up Krabby Patty Burgers as the fry cook. Fifteen years after The Krusty Krab made its splash into the watery, whimsical world of Bikini Bottom, a real company located here on dry land, IJR Capital Investments, LLC, filed a service mark application with the USPTO for “The Krusty Krab” for “restaurant services.” Viacom objected, IJR persisted, and the whole dispute landed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas with Viacom suing for various claims including trademark infringement and dilution. Viacom moved for summary judgment, which the Court granted faster than you can ask, “Who lives in a pineapple under the sea?” How did Viacom best this real world imposter? In several ways. First, even though Viacom did not have a registration for “The Krusty Krab,” that did not sink its infringement claim. Far from it. The Court noted that “The ‘Krusty Krab’ backdrop is regularly featured in the television show and was also depicted in two SpongeBob SquarePants feature films released in 2004 and 2015, that had total gross receipts of over $470 million.” Further, Viacom established rights in the name “through its sales and licensing of consumer products.” Second, the Court observed that trademark protection extends to “specific ingredients of a successful T.V. series,” including such things as symbols, design elements, and characters that the public directly associates with the plaintiff or its products. The Court cited a previous case where the terms “Kryptonite” and the “Daily Planet” were imbued with trademark protection because they had been a “staple of the Superman character and story.” The Viacom Court had little trouble finding that The Krusty Krab was a protectable trademark, even though there had never been a single Krabby Patty served under that name in real life. Third, the Court found The Krusty Krab had acquired secondary meaning given its long, storied history as part of the immensely popular TV series. Finally, there was little doubt consumers would likely be confused into believing that the real-world Krusty Krab was somehow affiliated with its fictional brother down in Bikini Bottom. In this regard, the Court was persuaded by the results of a nationwide survey showing that thirty percent of the respondents (restaurant goers) believed Viacom was the source of the Defendant’s restaurant. So, the lesson from many leagues down under is that in certain scenarios fictional locations can be protected by the Lanham Act. The Krusty Krab is one such location given its longevity and popularity as an under the sea eatery in the iconic TV series SpongeBob SquarePants. The Court got it right. The faux Krusty Krab should now sleep with the crustaceans.
January 13, 2017
by J. Michael Keyes
Trademarks
Change is Coming: New Rules for TTAB Opposition and Cancellation Proceedings
The United States Patent and Trademark Office recently issued final rules amending the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Rules of Practice and raising fees for many transactions involving trademarks. The new rules and fees will take effect on January 14, 2017, and will apply to all proceedings filed on or after that date and, to the extent practical, to all proceedings that are pending on that date. A link to the new rules appears here, and a link to the new fees appears here. The new TTAB rules are intended to make proceedings in the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board more efficient and less costly, and formalize many of the Board’s current practices. Electronic Communications The new rules move TTAB practice toward paperless filing and docketing by strongly encouraging parties to file documents electronically through ESTTA, the Board’s electronic filing system. The rules also encourage the parties to communicate with each other electronically by making e-mail the default system for service, and eliminate the practice of allowing parties extra time to respond to documents served by First Class Mail. The parties may agree in writing to service by means other than e-mail, but because the response time will not change if they do so, the parties may also wish to agree to provide a courtesy copy by e-mail at the time a document is served. In addition, all documents that are required to be filed with the Board must be filed electronically through ESTTA, with only a few limited exceptions. If ESTTA is not operating when a document is due, in most, but not all, circumstances the filer may file the document by paper, along with a petition to the Director and the required $200 fee for the petition, requesting leave to file a paper version of the document. This rule makes plain that there may now be a cost to waiting until the last minute to make a filing. Commencing an Opposition or Cancellation As under current practice, parties may obtain extensions of up to 180 days from publication to oppose an application. A request to extend the time to oppose an application filed under Section 66 may be filed only electronically. There are no exceptions to this rule. It therefore is important not to wait until the last minute to request an extension if a Madrid application is involved. An extension request for an application filed under Sections 1 or 44 should be filed electronically, but if ESTTA is down, the request may be made through a paper filing accompanied by a petition to the Director and the required fee. The opposition period for all applications is the same as under current practice, i. e., 30 days from publication. A party may request an initial extension of 30 days upon request, followed by a second request for a 60-day extension upon a showing of good cause, or one extension of 90 days upon a showing of good cause. It will no longer be possible to request an initial extension of 60 days. In addition, a party may request a final 60-day extension upon stipulation or with the consent of the applicant. Beginning on January 14, 2017, there will be a fee of $100 for each electronically-filed extension request up to 120 days from publication, and $200 for a final 60-day extension. The fees for filing these requests by paper will be $200 and $300, respectively. The substance of a Notice of Opposition or Petition for Cancellation will not change from current practice, but there will be some important procedural differences. First, oppositions against Madrid applications must be filed electronically. There are no exceptions. Oppositions against applications filed under Sections 1 or 44 and Petitions for Cancellation should be filed electronically, but if ESTTA is down the Notice of Opposition or Petition for Cancellation may be filed by paper accompanied by a petition to the Director and the applicable fee. If a Notice of Opposition is being filed at the opposition deadline, or a Petition for Cancellation includes any claims based on grounds that are time-sensitive, the notice or petition may need to be filed using the Priority Mail Express procedure set forth in Trademark Rules 2.195-2.198 if ESTTA is down. In addition, in an opposition against a Madrid application, the cover sheet to the Notice of Opposition will control the grounds and goods or services that are the subject of the opposition. Once the opposition deadline has passed, the opposer cannot add additional grounds or goods/services to an opposition against a Madrid application. Thus, it is crucial to confirm that all goods or services that will be the subject of an opposition against a Madrid application and all grounds for such an opposition are listed in the cover sheet before the time to oppose closes. Finally, the Board will be reinstituting its pre-2007 practice of serving the Notice of Opposition or Petition for Cancellation. When a Notice of Opposition or Petition for Cancellation is in proper form, the Board will send an e-mailed notice of institution identifying the proceeding and containing a link to the electronic proceeding record to the opposer or its counsel and to the applicant or its attorney in an opposition, or in a cancellation, to the petitioner or its counsel and to the record owner of the registration that is the subject of the proceeding or its domestic representative, and, if the petitioner identifies an owner who is not the record owner, notice will also be sent to the alleged owner. A petition for cancellation must indicate, to the best of the petitioner’s knowledge, the name, address and current e-mail address of the current owner of the registration. Because of these new procedures, it is important that the owner of a registration keep its contact information current in the PTO’s registration files. Discovery Under the new rules, discovery will be more limited and streamlined than under current practice. The new rules also afford the parties more flexibility to tailor discovery to the specific needs of their case by, for example, limiting its scope, shortening the response times or agreeing to reciprocal disclosures instead of formal discovery requests. Also, unlike practice under the present rules, requests must be served early enough in the discovery period that responses will be due before discovery closes. This means that a party will no longer be able to wait until discovery is about to close to serve its requests. The scope of discovery will also be more limited. The new rules expressly incorporate the doctrine of proportionality, which is also made explicit in the revised version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that took effect in December 2015, and has been a hallmark of the Board’s decisions concerning discovery for many years. In addition, the number of document requests and requests for admission each will be limited to 75, including all subparts. As with the current practice with respect to interrogatories, a party who believes that it has been served with more than the allowed number of requests may respond by interposing a general objection, after which the propounding party may re-serve the discovery in amended form to comply with the limits imposed by the rules. A party may move to increase the discovery limits for good cause. Comments to the rules suggest that good cause may be found when the opposing party is a foreign entity that is not subject to a deposition in the U.S., or when the opposition involves multiple parties or an extensive list of goods or services. There is one exception to the 75 request limit for requests for admission to allow each party to serve one comprehensive request to authenticate documents that the opposing party produced in discovery. Such a request must identify the specific documents to which the request applies, and the responding party must admit which specific documents are authentic, and identify any that are not. In general, a discovery deposition of a witness residing in a foreign country must be taken by written interrogatories unless the Board, upon motion for good cause, orders that the deposition be taken orally or the parties so stipulate. If an officer, director, managing agent or other witness of a foreign party will be present in the United States during the discovery period, that person may be deposed orally while in the U.S. There is no obligation on a foreign party to disclose if or when its witnesses will be traveling to the U.S. during the discovery period. It would be advisable, therefore, to include an interrogatory to a non-U.S. adverse party to request this information specifically if an oral deposition is of interest. There also were changes to Trademark Rule 2.120(f), which governs motions to compel discovery. As with current practice, the parties must meet and confer in an attempt to resolve the issues before such a motion may be filed. The amendments to the rules, however, have imposed new time limits on when a motion to compel may be brought. A motion to compel a party to serve initial disclosures must be brought within 30 days of when the disclosures were due, or the motion is waived. A motion to compel involving any other type of discovery request must be made promptly, and in no event may be brought after the first pre-trial disclosures are due. The changes to the discovery rules will require parties to focus on the information that is most relevant to their cases, and should discourage broad, sweeping requests that amount to a fishing expedition. These changes will also benefit parties who start discovery early in the discovery period, and who are prompt in raising any discovery disputes. Trial Probably the modifications that have received the most attention are the changes to the manner in which evidence may be submitted during a party’s testimony period. Under current practice, parties typically present evidence through oral testimony of one or more witnesses at a testimonial deposition, which is subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence. As at a trial in a court, the opposing party or its attorney may make objections to testimony or exhibits marked at the deposition, and may cross-examine the witness. Testimonial evidence may also be presented in other formats, such as through an affidavit or declaration, but only if the parties agree to that procedure. This will change under the new rules, which will allow a party to decide unilaterally whether it wishes to present its direct testimony through an oral deposition or whether it prefers to do so through an affidavit or declaration, which can be considerably less expensive and time-consuming. Under the new Rule 2.123, a party may submit its direct testimony through an affidavit or declaration, which must comply with the Federal Rules of Evidence. When a party elects to present a witness’s direct testimony in writing, however, the proffering party must make the witness available for cross-examination, which can be done orally if the witness is in the United States, or through written interrogatories if the witness is in a foreign country. A party electing to cross-examine an opposing party’s witness must bear the expense of the cross-examination, which will consist primarily of paying for the court reporter and copies of the transcripts. The proffering party will be responsible for the cost of producing the witness. A notice to cross-examine a declarant or affiant must be served within twenty days of service of the affidavit or declaration, and must be filed with the Board. The deposition must be completed within thirty days of the date of the notice. The new rules also specify the procedure for taking testimony from witnesses who are not located in the United States. Generally, testimony of a non-U.S. witness must be taken through written interrogatories. Accordingly, if a foreign witness submits a declaration in a TTAB proceeding, the cross-examination must be conducted through written interrogatories. The new rules, however, provide that if the non-proffering party serves a notice of taking testimonial deposition by written questions of a witness who will be in the United States at the time the deposition will be taken, the party seeking the deposition may, within twenty days of service of the notice, file a motion on good cause to have the deposition taken orally. In addition to submitting trial evidence by testimony or affidavit/declaration, as in the past a party may submit certain types of evidence, such as printouts of registrations, printed publications, internet materials and the like, through a Notice of Reliance. The rules have clarified, but not changed, certain aspects of the requirements for evidence that may be submitted through a Notice of Reliance.
January 10, 2017
by Susan Progoff
Trademarks
Phish Snared in Trademark Office’s Net Due to Phan Products
Ask any fan of the American improvisatory rock band Phish to explain the significance of the following pattern and you will invariably receive the same answer: It’s of course the pattern of drummer Jon Fishman’s iconic dress, which he has worn during nearly all of the band’s 1,700-plus shows. But the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) thinks something is a bit fishy, and has repeatedly rejected Phish’s pending applications to register the pattern for entertainment services, clothing, and other merchandise. The refusal rests in part on the PTO’s assertion that the pattern is merely ornamental and lacks distinctiveness such that consumers would not understand it as exclusively identifying Phish products or services. The PTO has cited an abundance of products bearing the design created and sold by Phish fans through the Etsy online marketplace. Nearly all of the products include the words “Phish” or “Fishman” in the title. Due to the prevalence of these fan products, the PTO contends, the design does not necessarily indicate a single source – it could refer to any number of parties selling products with the design. (Having just attended the Phish New Year’s Eve show, I can attest to the staggering amount of fan-created merchandise featuring this design, including flags, shirts, ties, bow ties, eyeglasses, bandanas, leggings, jumpsuits, and even a matching sequined tuxedo/ball gown combo worn by one Phish-loving couple.) You can find the PTO’s initial refusal here. In an attempt to convince the PTO of its exclusive rights in the design, Phish argued the design has acquired distinctiveness and submitted substantial evidence of the band’s use of the pattern, including decades of articles referencing or featuring pictures of Fishman’s dress and affidavits from those closely associated with the band, including Phish’s general counsel and archivist Kevin Shapiro, describing the band’s long-time use of the design and significant sales of products bearing the design. The response also dismissed the third-party uses cited by the PTO as “bootleg merchandise,” which are clearly attempting to trade on Phish’s goodwill in the pattern. The band indicated that it intends to engage in a robust trademark enforcement program to stamp out these uses, but that it needs “acknowledgement of its rights in the mark to have a high rate of success.” You can find Phish’s initial response here. Although the PTO recently accepted the claim of distinctiveness for entertainment and music services, it continues to reject the claim for Phish merchandise in part on the ground purchasers may instead view the parties producing “knock-off goods” as the source of the merchandise. This is certainly not the end of the road (or stream) for Phish, which now has an opportunity to submit additional evidence of distinctiveness or arguments against the refusal. Nonetheless, the band’s experience serves as a cautionary tale in brand management both for musicians and other brand owners, especially for those that, like Phish, have an enthusiastic fan base with a long history of creating and selling fan art and merchandise. These often well-intentioned tributes can have very negative repercussions because each unlicensed coexisting use of a mark weakens the original mark owner’s scope of rights. If the coexistence becomes too widespread, the mark owner may even lose all rights to exclusively use its mark. Additionally, brand owners should remember that the PTO is not a closed ecosystem – it will take into account evidence of third-party use to determine whether an applicant may assert exclusive rights in the purported mark. So what are brand owners like Phish to do? First and foremost, they should adopt a consistent enforcement strategy for key trademarks as early as possible. And this strategy should evolve over time to account for technological changes in the marketplace, such as the creation of online retailers like Etsy and Ebay (both of which allow brand owners to request removal of infringing and counterfeit products). For brands wishing to take a lighter approach to enforcement against fan-created merchandise, it is also equally important to collect any direct evidence showing that consumers associate the mark with its owner (i.e., message board comments, consumer letters or statements, advertisements, etc.), which could help to counteract an argument that the mark lacks distinctiveness. However, if the coexistence with fan-created merchandise is pervasive, even this type of evidence could prove unsuccessful. We will continue to monitor these applications to see if Phish wriggles free of the PTO’s refusal.
January 9, 2017
by Evan Everist
Trademarks
The Second Circuit Gets the Joke – Affirms Dismissal of Trademark Parody Lawsuit
Last January, we blogged about a district court decision involving trademark parody in Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc. In that decision, the court held that defendant My Other Bag had convincingly argued that its products, shown below, were a parody of Louis Vuitton’s iconic handbag and, as such, did not violate Louis Vuitton’s trademark and copyright rights. Granting summary judgment to My Other Bag, the district judge commented that Louis Vuitton perhaps “cannot take a joke” and observed that “in some cases, it is better to ‘accept the implied compliment in a parody’ and to smile or laugh than it is to sue.” The Second Circuit Court of Appeals got the joke, issuing a Summary Order on December 22, 2016 affirming the district court’s decision in favor of My Other Bag. This result was not a surprise, as it was reported that at oral argument, one of the appellate judges had laughed at an argument advanced by Louis Vuitton’s counsel, saying “This is a joke. I understand you don’t get the joke. But it’s a joke.” Turning to the merits of the legal arguments, the Second Circuit agreed that the My Other Bag tote bag qualified under the parody defense to a trademark dilution claim. The bags mimicked Louis Vuitton’s designs in a way that was recognizable, but still a “conscious departure” from Louis Vuitton’s luxury image. Accordingly, it was clear that My Other Bag was not a real Louis Vuitton handbag. Further “the fact that the joke on LV’s luxury image is gentle, and possibly even complimentary to LV, does not preclude it from being a parody.” The court distinguished other cases in which the parody defense to a dilution claim was rejected where the defendant had used the plaintiff’s trademark as a designation of source to sell its goods. Here, My Other Bag was the “undisputed designation of source.” The appellate court also affirmed summary judgment on Louis Vuitton’s New York state law dilution claim, holding that even though the New York dilution statute “does not provide an explicit fair use defense, the manifest parodic use here precludes the requisite finding that the marks are “substantially similar” for purposes of prevailing on the state law dilution claim. The Second Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of the trademark infringement claim, holding that under a deferential or a de novo standard of review, obvious differences between the marks, the lack of market proximity between the products at issue and “minimal, unconvincing evidence of consumer confusion” compel a judgment in favor of My Other Bag. Finally, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s holding that the My Other Bag tote bag did not constitute copyright infringement. The parodic use of Louis Vuitton’s designs was found to constitute a “transformative” use as a new expression and message, and the remaining fair use factors under the Copyright Act either weighted in favor of My Other Bag or were deemed irrelevant. The message of this case, in both the district court and Second Circuit opinions, is that brand owners may not like trademark parodies, but depending on how their marks are presented on the parody products, it can be very difficult to do anything about it under a trademark or copyright theory of intellectual property protection.
January 5, 2017
by Sandra Edelman
Copyrights
Usher’s Still in the Clear in Copyright Suit
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the dismissal on summary judgment of copyright infringement claims brought by Daniel Marino (not that Dan Marino) against Usher and nineteen other defendants in Marino v. Usher. The decision underscores the bedrock principle that joint authors cannot sue their co-authors for copyright infringement and serves as a cautionary tale for joint authors, illustrating how not to vindicate their rights when their joint work has been licensed without their authorization. Marino was part of a songwriting trio with defendants Dante Barton and William Guice that co-wrote a song called “Club Girl” in 2001. Barton successfully shopped the song to the music industry, and landed a licensing deal with Usher’s representatives. “Club Girl” was re-worked with Marino’s assistance, recorded, renamed “Bad Girl” and released to the public on Usher’s 2004 album “Confessions.” As the district court noted, Marino’s problems arose from entrusting the trio’s business affairs to Dante Barton. When Mr. Barton copyrighted “Club Girl,” he did not include Marino as an author. And when Mr. Barton negotiated the licensing agreement with Usher, Marino was named only as a musician, not as a songwriter. So when “Bad Girl” was released, Marino was not credited as a songwriter, and he never received any songwriting royalties. After waiting several years, Marino sued Usher, the other members of the songwriting trio and seemingly every other entity affiliated in any way with “Bad Girl,” asserting myriad claims including direct, vicarious and contributory infringement. He also sought an accounting and a constructive trust. Ultimately, all the causes of action against all of the defendants were dismissed on various grounds at various times. Marino appealed all of these orders, in addition to many other unappealable orders of the district court. With the benefit of hindsight, it is surprising that the case lasted as long as it did, because Marino admitted from the start that he, Barton and Guice were joint authors of “Club Girl.” As a joint author, Marino could not sue Barton or Guice for copyright infringement. And it follows that there could be no vicarious or contributory infringement by the other defendants in the absence of an underlying direct infringement. These principles are straightforward, and the district court called Marino’s arguments to the contrary “absurd.” Also, as a joint author, Marino’s consent was not required for Barton to license the song to Usher. Contrary to Marino’s claims, the licensing of “Club Girl” to Usher on an exclusive basis without Marino’s consent did not invalidate the license; rather, it transformed it into a non-exclusive license. Because Usher and his representatives were operating under a valid license and within its scope, they could not be liable for any direct infringement. The Court also found that Marino himself granted an implied license by assisting Usher and his representatives in creating “Bad Girl” from “Club Girl.” Finally, although Barton was legally permitted to license “Club Girl” without Marino’s consent, he still would have been required to account to Marino for any profits earned from licensing “Club Girl.” But Marino’s accounting and constructive trust claims were not properly pleaded, so they were preempted by the Copyright Act. Marino based his accounting and constructive trust claims on the alleged underlying infringement. By doing so, he subsumed those claims within his infringement claims, which led to their preemption. The lesson here, and what Marino could have done (and what he belatedly tried to do) was to assert accounting and constructive trust claims not based on the underlying infringement, but rather based on the profits earned by Guice and Barton from licensing “Club Girl.” These claims would not have run afoul of the laws applicable to joint authorship because they would not have challenged the basis for Guice and Barton earning profits from “Club Girl” in the first place, but instead would have asserted Marino’s valid right to share in those profits. There may have been practical reasons why Marino did not choose this course. The accounting and constructive trust claims could not have been brought against the deep-pocketed (and famous) defendants, because licensees have no duty to account to joint authors for lost profits earned by the joint authors with whom they contract. Also, state law accounting and constructive trust claims would not have provided the same potential for the recovery of attorneys’ fees. But these decisions harmed Marino even more in the end. Due to the frivolity of his claims, he was assessed over one million dollars in defendants’ attorneys’ fees (an amount that was eventually reduced by ninety percent due to his financial condition). Going forward, joint authors who feel wronged by their co-authors would be wise to understand the broad scope of permissible activities in which joint authors can engage with respect to the joint work, and the restrictions inherent in seeking to right those wrongs through the Copyright Act, as opposed to more traditional remedies.
January 3, 2017
by Jonathan Montcalm
Patents
Will forum shopping days, like holiday shopping days, soon come to an end?
It’s no secret that plaintiffs bringing patent litigation choose the forum carefully. Though the appellate review of patent litigation is centralized in one appellate court with limited jurisdiction – the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit – patent litigations proceed in district courts of general jurisdiction throughout the nation. There is a remarkable concentration of cases; over half of the patent infringement cases filed in 2015 were filed in two jurisdictions: the Eastern District of Texas (43.6%) and the District of Delaware (9.3%). The other 47% of cases were spread among the remaining 92 district courts across the nation. One defendant is challenging this practice, and the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to consider the issue. TC Heartland LLC was sued in federal court in Delaware for alleged patent infringement. TC Heartland moved to transfer the venue to Indiana, its state of incorporation, but the request was denied. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and TC Heartland petitioned for certiorari. TC Heartland’s argument relies on a distinction between general venue rules – which allow for suit in any jurisdiction in which a corporation operates or can be found – and the specific venue rules for patent cases. In simplified terms, TC Heartland’s argument is as follows: Section 1400(b), the patent venue provision, states that a “civil action for patent infringement” can be brought in one of two places: (1) the district in which defendant resides, or (2) a place where defendant committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. Section 1391(c), a general venue provision, has come to mean that a defendant can be sued in any jurisdiction in which personal jurisdiction can be exercised over it. In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "§ 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c),” which is a general venue provision. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). In 1990, the Federal Circuit was asked to decide a similar issue as in Fourco in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Noting that Congress had revised § 1391 in 1988, the Federal Circuit stated that it was faced with a “question of first impression.” It came to the opposite decision as the Supreme Court. The Federal Circuit held that the new § 1391 applies to patent infringement cases, and that a corporate defendant “resides” in any jurisdiction in which there would be personal jurisdiction. In 2011, Congress modified § 1391 again, providing that § 1391 governs “all civil actions” “except as otherwise provided by law.” Petitioner TC Heartland argues that the general venue statute does not modify the patent-specific statute, particularly in light of the 2011 amendment. The respondent, Kraft Foods, argues that the Federal Circuit correctly ruled that § 1391 – after the 1988 amendment – does modify § 1400(b), and that the Federal Circuit’s decision was correct. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 14. This complicated issue of statutory construction is the type of issue the Supreme Court enjoys. We can expect to see a hotly-contested issue and some heavy-duty briefing with extensive legislative history and analysis, and a substantial number of amicus briefs. Just at the petition stage, the Court received seven amicus briefs from four industry groups, 56 professors and 33 companies. If Heartland is successful in narrowing the jurisdictions in which a defendant may be sued, the ruling could apply to copyright cases as well, though the limits would not be the same. Section 1400(b) allows a defendant in a patent infringement suit to be sued in (1) the district in which it resides, or (2) a place where defendant committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business. In contrast, a copyright case can proceed under § 1400(a) in any jurisdiction “in which the defendant or his agent resides or may be found.” Stay tuned for further developments on this case at The TMCA!
December 28, 2016
by Shannon Bjorklund
Copyrights
Dear Fashion Santa, Let Me Explain…
We only want one thing for Christmas this year: clear and unambiguous terms for ownership of intellectual property. We know you’ll understand after the year you’ve been having. #FashionSanta was the social media sensation of the 2015 holiday season. Children and adults alike (including Canada’s own Justin Bieber) lined up for selfies with the sexy and stylish Fashion Santa at Yorkdale Mall in Toronto. The exciting, new spin on Father Christmas was created by long-time fashion model Paul Mason after he discovered his ability to grow a glorious, long, white beard. This Canadian Père Noël won’t be caught in an over-sized jacket of tacky faux fur – Fashion Santa is a man of exquisite taste, with a predilection for designer labels. He prefers a burgundy leather biker jacket or a bespoke crimson suit. And everything seemed holly jolly until Mason and the mall fell out over ownership of the intellectual property – now the mall has a new model to play Fashion Santa for Christmas 2016. Fashion Santa bedecked in Dolce & Gabanna, Salvatore Ferragamo, and John Varvatos. Precisely what kind of intellectual property exists in Fashion Santa is an open question. Mason filed a copyright application in Canada for a literary work entitled “Fashion Santa,” claiming a publication date of September 23, 2014. It is uncertain what the now registered copyright protects. While copyright cannot protect short words and phrases like the name Fashion Santa, it is well recognized that copyright can exist in literary characters. To qualify for protection, a character must be original and well-developed, rather than a simple stock character type. Judge Learned Hand provides an analogy to Shakespeare: “If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress.” Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). Where on this spectrum does Fashion Santa fall? It isn’t all that clear. The mall took a different route, filing a Canadian trademark application for the words FASHION SANTA on December 8, 2015. Mason filed for the same two weeks later. The application filed by the mall primarily covers advertising and promotional services. But is a word mark really the thing to protect here and, if so, how strong is the FASHION SANTA mark? Surely SANTA is a generic term for old Saint Nick and FASHION is highly descriptive. While the Canadian examination documents are not publicly available, the USPTO database shows the Examiners requested disclaimer of the term FASHION in both the parallel US applications; as well as SANTA in Mason’s application. Perhaps instead of a word mark, the trademark is in the character itself (something like an exceedingly dapper breakfast cereal mascot). If trademark protection is otherwise limited to the name, a competitor would be free to introduce Kris Kringle Couture. It is not exactly surprising that Mason saw his creation as a work of art, while the mall saw it as a brand – but all this humbug could have been avoided if the parties had negotiated an appropriate agreement before Fashion Santa started posing for selfies with the Biebs. That’s why we’re asking for better contract terms around IP ownership. We promise we’ve been very good this year and hardly sued anyone.
December 20, 2016
by Jake Holt
Trademarks
Dropbox Gets “Thru” on Summary Judgment With Successful Laches Defense
“The Ninth Circuit has stated that laches is seldom susceptible of resolution by summary judgment,” but the federal district court for the Northern District of California recently held just that in Dropbox Inc. v. Thru Inc. Thru Inc. is a software company offering file management software, which first began using the designation “Dropbox” in 2004. Dropbox is a major player in the software industry, offering an application by the same name that allows users to store files in the cloud. Dropbox launched its application in 2008 and today has over 500 million users. Dropbox filed an application to register the mark DROPBOX for its software application in September 2009, which matured to registration on February 4, 2014. Thru sent a single demand letter to Dropbox objecting to its use of the mark in December 2011 and did not take any further action for over 2 years, when it petitioned to cancel Dropbox’s trademark registration in February 2014. The cancellation action, however, did not actually challenge Dropbox’s continued use of the mark; it merely sought to remove Dropbox’s registration from the register. It was not until Dropbox filed the instant proceeding in April 2015 for declaratory relief, in which Thru asserted counterclaims for trademark infringement and unfair competition, that Thru made any genuine effort to stop Dropbox from using the mark. Dropbox moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of laches. In order to prove laches, a party must show that its opponent unreasonably delayed filing suit and that such delay would cause prejudice if the suit were to continue. In its verified interrogatory responses, Thru said it only learned of Dropbox’s use of the mark in mid-2011 (a time when Dropbox already had 40 million users). Yet, emails produced during discovery blatantly contradicted Thru’s interrogatory response and showed that Thru was aware of Dropbox at least as early as June 2009. Further, when confronted about this discrepancy, Thru’s witness conceded that the interrogatory response was false. As such, the Court found that the clock started running on Thru’s claims in June 2009 and that laches could be presumed after June 2013. In addition to showing that Thru blatantly lied about its first knowledge of Dropbox, emails showed that Thru made strategic plans to wait to file an infringement suit until Dropbox announced its IPO. The Court held that “[t]hese documents demonstrate that Thru purposefully delayed bringing suit in an attempt to increase its leverage over Dropbox and thus the value of its claims.” Further, Thru’s delay clearly prejudiced Dropbox because during the relevant time period Dropbox had spent millions of dollars to build both its business and brand recognition. Given the unique facts at play, this decision is not likely to make it easier to succeed in the 9th Circuit on a laches defense at the summary judgment stage. Nevertheless, that won't stop parties with a potential laches argument from trying their hardest to convince courts that the standard to establish laches has been lowered from the "clouds."
December 16, 2016
by Robert M. Wasnofski, Jr and Kaydi Osowski
Advertising
Friends, Family and High Blood Pressure - FTC Takes Action Against Undisclosed Family Reviews and Unsubstantiated Claims for Mobile Health App
In previous posts, we’ve discussed the Federal Trade Commission's significant enforcement efforts focused on two hot button issues: unsubstantiated health marketing claims and deceptive product endorsements. Once again, both came together in a Complaint and Settlement announced by the agency on December 12, 2016. The target of the enforcement action was Aura Labs, Inc., which had marketed an Instant Blood Pressure (IBP) mobile app, purported to give blood pressure readings as accurately as a traditional blood pressure “cuff” device. Consumers paid $3.99 or $4.99 to download the app; input data on their gender, age, weight and height; and then were instructed to remove outer clothing, place their right index finger over the rear camera lens and light, and place their mobile device against the left side of their chest until a blood pressure measurement was taken and displayed. The problem? Clinical studies demonstrated that the blood pressure readings generated by the IBP were significantly less accurate than readings taken by a traditional blood pressure cuff. Aura Labs also ran into trouble with consumer endorsements posted about the product in the Apple App Store and on its website. In the App Store, “Archie” gave the product five stars. Archie was in fact Ryan Archdeacon, the CEO and President of the company. Interestingly, Archie’s review was not all glowing. While proclaiming that the product was a “breakthrough,” he noted that “there are some kinks to work out” and that users might experience “some connection problems”. While these quality issues were disclosed in the review (albeit not by the company), Archie’s identity as an officer of the company was not. On the “What People Think” portion of Aura Labs’ website, two positive endorsements were posted by relatives of Aura’s co-founder. The stipulated federal court order settling the matter enjoined Aura Labs from making efficacy claims about the IBP without “competent and reliable scientific evidence” to substantiate the ad claims, misrepresenting that any endorser of the IBP is an independent user or ordinary consumer, and failing to disclose material connections between the endorser and the company. A monetary sanction of almost $600,000 was imposed and suspended based on the company’s inability to pay (the agency also included one of its typical “avalanche” clauses requiring the full amount to be paid if it is later found that the company had misrepresented its financial condition). So what can you do to keep your company’s blood pressure in check? All advertisers should caution their officers, employees and family members not to post product reviews without full disclosure of their material connection. Companies selling health products, apps or services should ensure that their advertising claims are adequately substantiated beforehand and if the science does fit the claim, don’t suggest otherwise.
December 15, 2016
by Fara Sunderji and Sandra Edelman
Data Protection and Privacy
China Adopts Tough and Sweeping Cybersecurity Law
On November 7, 2016, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress promulgated the Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China, a law James Zimmerman, chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China calls “a step backwards for innovation in China that won’t do much to improve security.” The law becomes effective on June 1, 2017 and will apply to businesses in every sector of the economy. While the law purports to create an overall national cyber security plan, its provisions, some of which are vague, create significant potential uncertainties for companies doing business in China. Below are some of the noteworthy provisions of the law. Full details regarding the law can be found on Dorsey’s Computer Fraud and Data Protection Blog here. Makes local storage mandatory and eliminates the option of storing business data outside of China, if (1) the company falls within the definition of an operator of “critical information infrastructure” (“CII”), and (2) there are personal information and “important data” collected and generated in China. For certain “important” sectors enhanced security obligations will be triggered. These include public communications, information service, energy, transport, water conservancy, finance, public service and e-government, as well as other CII. Companies will be required to have clear policies and procedures to protect data and information, and those policies and procedures must comply with national standards. Companies must establish high-level corporate oversight, including at the board of directors level, which must provide adequate funding of the program in proportion to the size of the company and the risk. Companies must identify and empower the relevant stakeholders and place overall control of data security in the hands of an individual or a small group of individuals. Companies must carefully select and scrutinize the individuals in charge of data security compliance. Not only must they not pose a risk for unethical behavior, they must be trained and certified with a cybersecurity expertise. Companies must have clear standards and procedures that are communicated effectively to the entire workforce. Conduct must conduct periodic audits of the effectiveness of the data security compliance program. Companies must consistently enforce the policies and establish mechanisms for reporting violations The law is broadly drafted, filled with ambiguities and creates significant potential uncertainties for companies doing business in China in terms of maintaining and protecting competitively sensitive and personal data. Going forward, the Chinese authorities will be interpreting and applying the many ambiguous and vague terms in the new regulations and implementing rules that will directly impact how companies conduct business in China. For businesses to grow in global markets like China, companies must support seamless mobility with the ability to conduct transactions on any device or platform in any country. It remains to be seen whether this law will enhance security of data in China and how difficult compliance may become.
December 8, 2016
by Daniel Goldberger, Ray Liu, Nick Akerman, Frank Hong, and Peter Corne
Trademarks
Sound Marks in China
A sound mark can be registered in China since May 1, 2014. According to a draft Standard of Examination issued by the Chinese Trademark Office, a sound mark can consist of a musical or non-musical sound, or a combination of both. Non-musical sound includes natural sound, human and animal voice. The first sound mark application in China was filed by China Radio International on May 4, 2014. The sound sought to be registered is the opening music for one of its programs and consists of music and human voice. That mark was preliminarily approved on February 13, 2016 and registered on May 14, 2016. As at the end of October 2016, five sound marks have been successfully registered in China, all consisting of both musical and non-musical sounds, including the first sound mark “SOFY” filed by a foreign party Unicharm, a Japanese household and hygiene products company, which registered on August 21, 2016. The Nokia ringtone was the first preliminarily approved application for a sound mark in China that consists of only musical sound. It will become a registered trademark in early January 2017 if the application is not opposed. The first sound mark application that will be “heard” by the IP Court in China is “Di Di Di Di Di Di.” That tune is the notification sound for an incoming message in QQ, one of the most popular social networking apps of Chinese IT Giant Tencent. The Chinese Trademark Office rejected the application on the basis that the sound mark in question lacks distinctiveness because it consists of six simple “Di” sounds only. The PRC Trademark Review and Adjudication Board maintained that rejection. According to the draft Standard of Examination, a sound mark shall meet the same examination requirements as visual marks. A few examples of non-registrable sounds are provided in the draft Standard, e.g., the national anthem of a country, religious music, dog barking or cat meowing for “pet breeding” services, baby laughter for “infant milk powder”, melody from classical music on “arrange and organize musical concert”. Until more guidance is available from the Chinese trademark authorities, applicants and trademark professionals will have to rely on their experience in prosecuting analogous applications as well as common sense in their efforts to secure a registration for a sound mark in China.
December 6, 2016
by Lilian Shi and Cedric Lam
Advertising
Comparative Advertising Do's and Don'ts from the NAD - Part 2
Last week we blogged about a recent decision of the National Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureau, holding that two YouTube videos for Rayovac brand batteries misleadingly communicated an unsupported "line" claim of superiority against all Energizer batteries. This post will discuss a second decision issued by NAD a few days later, also finding comparative advertising to be misleading. The problem this time? The product testing conducted by the advertiser on which the advertising claims were based failed to evaluate the performance of the competitive products in accordance with the manufacturer instructions for use. Zoetis, Inc. (Case # 6013 Oct. 31, 2016). Zoetis made claims on its website and in print advertising that its Simparica brand oral flea and tick medication for dogs provided better protection than the competitive Trifexis product marketed by the Elanco Animal Health division of Eli Lilly. Both Simparica and Trifexis are administered on a monthly basis and are FDA approved for re-dosing after 30 days. The labeling on both companies' products directs consumers to repeat the treatment after one month. Zoetis commissioned a study that compared the efficacy of both products after an initial administration of the competing flea and tick medications. Dogs were re-infested at days 0, 7, 14, 21, 28 and 35, without having re-dosed the dogs after 30 days, as directed by product labeling. Measurements of effectiveness were taken on these milestone days at 8, 12 and 24 hour intervals. Zoetis's advertising featured a chart that highlighted results of the study showing better efficacy by Simparica on day 35. Zoetis argued that day 35 results were relevant to pet owners who may forget to re-dose the dogs at the end of the month. According to Elanco, however, it was misleading to evaluate the efficacy of Trifexis on day 35 -- 5 days beyond the recommended re-dosing date. Elanco also complained that Zoetis had "cherry picked" data points for its chart showing superior performance by Simparica at the 8 hour measurement point on certain milestone days, whereas the products had more equivalent effect at 12 and 24 hours on those days. NAD concluded that it was misleading for Zoetis to advertise the day 35 results: "Testing the advertised products as they are intended to work, by following manufacturer's use instructions, provides the basis for a claim that a product is measurably better than its competitor because it does not materially distort the performance capability of competing products.... While consumers are free to disregard product instructions if they wish, advertisers have an obligation to follow product use instructions when conducting comparative performance testing for the purposes of claim support." NAD also agreed with Elanco that touting the better performance of Simparica at the 8 hour measurement point while ignoring the 12 and 24 hour measurements that showed more equivalent efficacy communicated the impliedly misleading message that Simparica was superior to Trifexis on the entire milestone day tested. NAD recommended that Zoetis discontinue advertising claims based on comparative performance after 35 days, but observed that Zoetis could make a non-comparative claim that Simparica is effective for 35 days, particularly for consumers who forget to re-dose their dogs on a monthly basis. NAD also noted that the different product performance results at 8, 12 and 24 hour intervals on the milestone days could have been properly advertised as a speed-to-efficacy superiority claim, rather than one of overall efficacy. The overarching lesson from the two NAD decisions discussed in Parts 1 and 2 of this post is that comparative advertising claims must be carefully and narrowly crafted. Competitors identified in such claims will likely scrutinize the advertising for both express and implied messages that cannot be substantiated. The pitfalls are many, and different types of comparative advertising calls for different precautions. But following the do's and don'ts of NAD in Spectrum Brands and Zoetis will help: If specific models of competitive products are the intended comparison of an advertisement, do identify those specific products clearly and unambiguously. Don't depict product varieties, use props or narrative content or tag lines that suggest a broader comparison is being made. If the comparative ad is based on performance testing of the competitive products, do test the products in accordance with labeling directions for use by consumers. Don't cherry pick data from test results if doing so communicates a misleading message of overall superiority. And do carefully correlate the advertising claim to the specific aspect of superiority revealed by the product testing.
December 5, 2016
by Sandra Edelman
Patents
Unexpected Post-Brexit IP Development: UK is to ratify the Unified Patent Court Agreement
On 28 November 2016, the UK Government made a surprising announcement at the meeting of the Competitiveness Council (an EU institution), stating that it intends to ratify the Unified Patent Court Agreement, marking its first commitment to a new EU initiative since the Brexit referendum in June. In a press release the UK Government stated that: “The UK will continue with preparations for ratification over the coming months. It will be working with the Preparatory Committee to bring the UPC into operation as soon as possible.” This is an unexpected development, as it appears to contradict much of the political rhetoric since the EU referendum result on 23 June 2016. The UPC system, which has been under intensive development for several years, will enable companies to defend their rights with a single patent and a single legal system across the EU. Most observers and legal professionals had considered the prospect of granting further supremacy of EU law and enhanced jurisdiction to the ECJ to be politically unlikely following the Brexit result. Therefore, it was generally thought that the UK would pull out of the UPC. The decision to ratify will require Parliamentary approval, so there is of course the potential for Parliamentary scrutiny and further delays. Before the referendum, it was anticipated that the UPC system would be in place by the end of 2017. It is difficult to assess whether in practice the patent court system would now progress towards the previous target for its commencement given the question mark over the UK’s involvement in the UPC post-Brexit. The UK was a driving force behind the UPC and one of the central divisions of the UPC (widely referred to as the “pharmaceutical court”) was to be set up in London. However, given that the UK is to leave the EU, which means that it would be unable to participate in the UPC system (unless the agreement constituting the system is radically overhauled), it would seem questionable whether the EU would now wish to allocate a budget for implementing the UPC and whether the other participants to the agreement would wish to ratify it at this stage. The agreement requires the ratification of at least thirteen countries before it comes into force including at least the UK, France and Germany (which has not yet ratified the agreement and may decide not to do so). The decision to ratify the UPC agreement has led to widespread speculation that the Government intends to seek a soft-Brexit and therefore keep close legal and regulatory ties to the EU following Brexit. However, Baroness Neville-Rolfe, the UK Minister of State for Intellectual Property, was keen to add in her statement that “the decision to proceed with ratification should not be seen as pre-empting the UK’s objectives or position in the forthcoming negotiations with the EU.” The reasoning behind the decision is not clear, but it appears that the Government has decided to honour its treaty obligations whilst it is still a member of the EU. However, like many of the recent political movements, the Government’s decision has raised further questions. It can perhaps be seen as a decision which at least keeps open the UK’s option for long term participation in the UPC, with further discussions to take place as part of the wider Brexit negotiations. In practice, though, it is difficult to see the UPC kicking into action whilst Brexit negotiations are on-going.
December 1, 2016
by Ron Moscona
Advertising
Comparative Advertising Do's and Don'ts from the NAD - Part 1
Two recent decisions of the National Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureau provide helpful insights into how product performance comparisons should (and should not) be crafted to be considered fair comparative advertising against competitors. The first decision, Spectrum Brands, Inc. (Case #6012 Oct. 26, 2016), involved a challenge by Energizer Holdings (of Energizer Bunny fame) to two YouTube videos that advertised the longer lasting power of Rayovac FUSION batteries marketed by Spectrum Brands, in comparison to Energizer MAX batteries. Both videos depicted humorous scenarios that occurred on family vacations, one in which a teenage daughter's electronic device abruptly blacks out and the other where the father's flashlight runs out of power just when he needs it most. Energizer conceded that Rayovac's high-end FUSION AA batteries do in fact provide longer lasting power than Energizer MAX batteries when used in certain devices. So what was Energizer's beef with the videos? It argued that the videos communicated a broader implied "line" claim that all Rayovac batteries last longer than all Energizer batteries, when that was not in fact the case. NAD agreed. NAD first stated the factors it looks at to determine whether a commercial reasonably conveys a "line" claim: (1) are there general brand references in the advertisement; (2) does the copy effectively limit the applicability of the advertising claims; (3) is only one variety of the product shown; and (4) is there a "beauty shot" of the product line that would reinforce a message of broader applicability of the claims. In this case, the Rayovac videos suffered from several problems. First, the specific products that were the intended focus of the ad - Rayovac Fusion AA and Energizer AA batteries -- were only fleetingly shown onscreen, and thus NAD found that these "brief visuals" were insufficient to limit the claim to Rayovac Fusion AA vs. Energizer AA batteries. The commercials also depicted a flashback scene where the father had selected the Energizer brand and says "silly bunny" -- a clear reference to the Energizer brand generally. And at the end of the commercial, the voiceover states "Batteries matter. Choose Rayovac" as the Rayovac logo appears full screen. These general references to both brands served to communicate that the whole Rayovac line of batteries is being compared to the whole Energizer battery line. NAD held that "Where, as here, an advertisement makes general brand references but fails to adequately qualify the claim to limit its applicability to the one product shown in the advertisement, NAD has found that it is likely to convey the message that the benefits or attributes touted extend to the entire product line." Interestingly, NAD had one further objection to the Rayovac video, involving the size of the flashlight used as a prop in the ad: it was the size flashlight that would normally use larger C or D batteries, not AA. This again communicated that the comparative longer lasting claim made in the videos extended beyond just the Energizer MAX AA batteries. NAD stated that nothing in its decision would preclude Spectrum Brands from crafting a more limited comparative superiority claim that more clearly targeted the Energizer MAX AA batteries. And NAD helpfully suggested that if Spectrum were to revise the videos, it should use a "mini flashlight" typically powered by AA batteries as a prop. Stay tuned for Part 2 of this post for further comparative advertising do's and don'ts from the NAD.
November 28, 2016
by Sandra Edelman
Copyrights
Dr. Seuss Sues in Sue-ville This Holiday Season
You know Green Eggs and Ham, and the Cat in The Hat, Horton, the Lorax, and others like that. But a new book is coming, although now a bit slow, It’s called “Oh, The Places You’ll Boldly Go!” Sure it sounds like the book already penned by Doc Seuss, But it’s not, oh it’s not, an infringer’s on the loose! Or so claims the estate of the author of Grinch, Bring on the lawyers, this case is a cinch! So the lawyers lined up and formed quite a roster, All hands on deck to take down this imposter. They filed their suit for the Green Eggs writer, And sought an injunction to make things a bit brighter. Who is this villain, this dastardly soul? Who dares to infringe "Oh, The Places You'll Go!?" The main culprit's a company called ComicMix, And its VP and others are in quite a fix. It is claimed they have copied a work of great fame, And created confusion in the market for same. They may ask, "what's the problem, say, what the heck?" "It's simply a mash-up with a touch of Star Trek." "We know about fair use and its factors of four," "We're sure to prevail, at the courthouse door." But fair use is tricky, as the defendants may see, It's not quite as simple as A, B, and C. Who will prevail, say, who will win? The defendants' chances appear quite dim. An injunction is likely, perhaps damages too, And fees for the lawyers, after all, they had to sue. For what appears to be a very good reason, Dr. Seuss sues in Sue-ville this holiday season. We will keep you all posted, it should be quite a sight, Happy holidays to all, and to all a good night!
November 21, 2016
by J. Michael Keyes
