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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

Bankruptcy Dispute Regarding “Coolcore” Trademark Heats Up in the First Circuit

March 14, 2017

by Alessandra Glorioso and Eric Lopez Schnabel

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In December 2015, the TMCA blogged about a decision in In re Tempnology, LLC, in which the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire held that a debtor’s rejection of a licensing agreement in bankruptcy terminated the licensee’s rights to continue using the “Coolcore” brand for chemical-free cooling fabrics. Back then, we noted that the decision was pending on appeal before the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (the “BAP”).  The BAP has spoken, and its decision rejects the bankruptcy court’s approach—rooted in case law from 1985—in favor of the modern trend of expanding protection for trademark licensees.

Here are some highlights from our December 2015 post that are relevant to a discussion of the BAP’s decision:

  • In 1985, the Fourth Circuit held that a licensee under an IP licensing agreement rejected by a debtor-licensor loses the right to continue using licensed IP, in the case of Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
  • In 1988, Congress enacted Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for licensees to retain their rights, including exclusivity rights, to use “intellectual property” and continue paying royalties for the duration of an executory licensing agreement that is rejected by a debtor-licensor.
  • The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “Intellectual Property” does not include trademarks.
  • Until 2010, courts commonly read the omission of trademarks from the definition of “Intellectual Property” to create a “negative inference” that Congress intended for Lubrizol to govern trademark licensing rights when a debtor rejects a licensing agreement. Under the “negative inference” approach, a licensee must cease producing and selling goods bearing the licensed trademark, frequently on relatively short notice.
  • In the past six years, the Federal Courts of Appeals for the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have rejected the “negative inference” in decisions that permit licensees to continue using licensed trademarks to produce and sell goods.

Back to In re Tempnology, after the debtor rejected a co-marketing and distribution agreement providing a non-exclusive license to use the “Coolcore” trademark and logo, the counterparty, Mission Products Holdings, Inc., sought to preserve its rights under Section 365(n).  The bankruptcy court applied the “negative inference” and held that Mission could not retain its rights to use Tempnology’s trademarks and logos.  It further found that Section 365(n) did not protect Mission’s exclusive distribution rights.

The BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusions that Mission’s exclusive distribution rights, as well as its trademark rights, were unprotected by Section 365(n).  However, it reversed the bankruptcy court’s finding that the debtor’s rejection of the agreement terminated Mission’s rights in the trademark and logo.  The BAP adopted the rationale set forth in Sunbeam Products v. Chicago American Manufacturing, 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012):  rejection of an agreement by a debtor does not “vaporize” the licensee’s trademark rights under the agreement.  The BAP found, like the Seventh Circuit, that such post-rejection rights are governed by non-bankruptcy law.

Thus, although Section 365(n) does not protect a licensee’s trademark rights, a debtor’s rejection of a contract conferring a trademark license—the same act that would trigger Section 365(n) if the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “Intellectual Property” included trademark rights—does not nullify the contract.  Rather, the act is tantamount to a breach and gives rise to state law contract damages or other applicable remedies for the counterparty, in this case Mission.  As the BAP’s decision highlights, this result is consistent with Section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, which deems a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract it has not assumed to be a breach of the agreement immediately before the date the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition.  In such an instance, a counterparty like Mission is generally left with a claim for damages as of the petition date and its substantive contractual rights remain intact, excluding a right of specific performance against the debtor.

The BAP’s decision is a victory for the right of trademark licensees to use licensed marks, but considering the issues that go hand-in-hand with trademark use, it may be a limited one.  Parameters of the licensee’s use of a trademark (i.e., Section 365(n)’s specification that a licensee may retain and exercise contractual rights to use the trademark for the duration of the contract), the status of the licensee’s non-trademark rights under the same agreement with the debtor (i.e., Mission’s distribution rights), and the debtor-licensor’s rights against the licensee remain unclear.

Our December 2015 post points out a drafting lesson derived from the Tempnology case that holds true—to separate IP licensing agreements from agreements on matters unrelated to IP, such as distribution.  As the BAP’s decision shows, bootstrapping non-IP rights to an IP agreement likely will not achieve protection of those rights under Section 365(n).  Additionally, as we noted before, bundling various IP rights in an integrated agreement may help secure the protections of Section 365(n).

Mission has appealed the BAP’s decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  At this time, appellate briefing is not complete, but there can be little doubt that the appeal is an opportunity for the First Circuit to expound upon the applicability and scope of Section 365(n).  Whether and to what extent the First Circuit embraces the approaches of the lower courts and/or other circuits remains to be seen.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.