.

Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Copyrights

Will Copyright Rules for Player Pianos Continue to Govern Digital Music Delivery?

March 27, 2018

by Brad Hattenbach

Download as a PDF

Share this page

Last month in our Olympics edition, we provided a glimpse into the arcane world of licensing of musical works under the U.S. Copyright system.  It’s actually crazier still.  Who knew that the legislative reaction to the introduction of player pianos at the turn of the last century would continue to govern the royalty scheme for satellite radio and digital streaming services?  In large part it’s true!  However, U.S. Representatives Doug Collins (R-Ga.) and Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) have introduced legislation in the form of the “Music Modernization Act” (MMA) avowedly to bring the royalty determination formula for digital music services into the 21st Century.  In truth, the MMA is a modest step, but a step nonetheless.

As a refresher, recall that there are two separate, primary expressions of music subject to copyright: 1) the song composition (i.e., the words and music, for example, embodied in sheet music); and 2) the sound recording, i.e., the performance of a song by an artist you hear on the radio or (for some of us Luddites) on the CD that you buy. Strangely, the ability to collect a royalty for the use of these two forms of the same song is different under the Copyright Act and it further differs when the sound recording is in a digital form.

A license to reproduce the composition (for example, on a record or CD, or in a digital file) is called a “mechanical right.”  In the early 1900’s, songwriters railed against the introduction of the player piano, fearing a loss of revenue in the sale of sheet music.  A court sided against the songwriters, stating that the royalty provisions in the Copyright Act at the time did not address anything other than copies of sheet music.  Significant lobbying prompted Congress to amend the Copyright Act to include a “mechanical license” and related royalties.  The lore is that “mechanical” referred to the machinery of the player piano using paper rolls to substitute for a human being reading sheet music to play a tune.

As recording mediums evolved beyond a paper roll into phonographs, cassette tapes, compact discs, and now digital files, the mechanical royalty has been applied to each new medium such that the songwriter receives a royalty for copies made.  If copies of the song are sold even once, then anyone else can record and sell their sound recording of the song, without any negotiation over terms, as long as they pay the mechanical license royalty.  Mechanical license royalties are paid to and distributed by a collective society of the songwriters and music publishers called the Harry Fox Agency (HFA) authorized by the Act.  Compensation for the rights in particular sound recordings come in the form of a percentage of the actual record sales paid to the recording artist per contract with the record distributor.

Any public performance of a musical composition (which includes broadcast radio) is subject to a compulsory license fee to the songwriter.  Typically a license is taken from one or more of the big three performance rights organizations (ASCAP, BMI, SESAC).  The fees per performance are standardized and set by a panel of administrative judges.  These clearinghouses keep databases of songs and songwriters, manage the performance royalties, and send appropriate payments to the songwriters according to the statutory fees.

Strangely, however, the performing artists that make the sound recordings you hear on the radio do not receive any compensation for the performance.  Up until the Copyright Act of 1976, there were no rights in sound recordings.  In the lead-up to the 1976 Act, terrestrial broadcasters (radio stations) argued that the performing artists did not need compensation for airplay because they received free publicity through airplay of the songs and received adequate compensation through record sales.  This argument won and an exemption still resides in the Copyright Act today for terrestrial radio, music clubs, restaurants and live performances.

But not with respect to digital performances.  Think streaming internet radio (Pandora) and interactive streaming services (Spotify).  In 1995, the exemption for royalties for sound recordings was removed with respect to the digital delivery of music performances by the Digital Performance in Sound Recording Act (DPRA).  A new agency called SoundExchange was created by the DPRA to collect and distribute sound recording royalties implemented by the act.  Mechanical royalties were left to administration under the historical structure with the HFA.  However, because they are not broadcast services, interactive streaming services fall under a different mechanical royalty scheme and do not receive the benefit of a blanket license with the HFA.  (The explanation why is worthy of another article.)  Thus, the streaming services sometimes must seek out individual songwriters and publishers, who often may be difficult to find, or at least provide public notice at the Copyright Office.  Failure to provide such notice can lead to hefty statutory penalties.

With all of this stratification, one might think that proposed MMA legislation would offer a comprehensive solution.  In actuality, the MMA, at over 100 pages long, really only accomplishes three narrow objectives related to mechanical licenses for digital music delivery.  First, the MMA sets up yet another rights clearinghouse called the “Mechanical Licensing Collective” (MLC) with a mandate to grant blanket mechanical licenses for streaming and interactive digital music delivery services and to remove the penalty for failure of notice to songwriters.  The MLC database would be public and any songwriter could claim rights in a song on the platform if not previously identified.  Second, the MMA would remove restrictions on consideration of market conditions in the setting of statutory royalty rates by the Royalty Board Judges.  (Curiously, this is not presently the case.)  Third, the MMA removes a limitation on single courts and judges having jurisdiction over rate challenges and instead provides for the random assignment of judges from the judicial district in which the case is properly brought, just as in all other civil cases.

The MMA does not address the third rail of payments to performing artists for public performance of sound recordings (i.e., radio airplay).  Nor does it propose to consolidate the various collectives and agencies that manage mechanical and performance royalties.  In fact, it adds yet another agency into the mix.  The MMA thus appears to be merely another patch on top of the original player piano rules.

There is no guarantee that the MMA will be enacted—this is the U.S. Congress we are talking about here.  However, there is strong industry support from all sides—music publishers, performance rights organizations, broadcasters, and digital media companies—so it may just have a chance.  We will be monitoring progress of the MMA over the coming year and will update you if any significant actions occur.

Related Categories:

Copyrights

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.