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Trump Brand Loses Trademark Licensing Dispute - Rules of Contract Law Prevail

May 30, 2018

by Daniel Goldberger and Sandra Edelman

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Trademark licensing disputes can present thorny issues at the intersection of contract and trademark law. And when the dispute involves the Trump brand for residential buildings, the adjudication of rights and obligations under a trademark license agreement can become national news. The decision in Residential Committee of the Board of Managers of 200 Riverside Boulevard at Trump Place Condominium v. DJT Holdings LLC was no bed of roses for DJT, as the court held that the 200 Riverside Building was not required to use the Trump name on the façade of the Building.

As recounted by the court, the 200 Riverside Building, consisting of 377 residential and four commercial units, was constructed around 1998, at which time the words “Trump Place” were “installed with large brass-finish characters in two locations on the Building’s façade.” In March 2000, Trump and the condominium board of the Building (the “Condo Board”) entered into a royalty-free license agreement, which granted a “nonexclusive, nontransferable right for the Building to use the Identification ‘Trump’ on its façade” in exchange for $1 and “other good and valuable consideration.”

In February 2017, the Condo Board conducted a straw poll among residential unit owners, and of the 253 unit owners who responded, 63% favored removal of the Trump signage. A month later, the Condo Board received what the court characterized as a “Threatening Letter” from DJT, stating that removal of the Trump Identifications from the Building “would constitute a flagrant and material breach of the License Agreement.” The Condo Board did not wait around to see if it would be sued, instead commencing an action for declaratory judgment that its License Agreement with DJT did not require the building to use the Trump signage. The Condo Board then moved for summary judgment.

The Trump team raised several arguments in response: first, the Condo board lacked standing; second, there was no controversy for the court to decide (at least yet); and third, under the License Agreement, the Condo Board either did not have the right to remove the Trump signage or it did not take the proper steps to do so. The court rejected each of these arguments.

DJT contended that standing was lacking because the “full” Condo Board did not vote to authorize the lawsuit. The court easily dispensed with this argument, noting that the two Board seats that did not vote were vacant, and had not voted in Board matters in several years. More importantly, the Condo Board’s rules required a quorum, which it had during the meeting at which the vote occurred.

Next, DJT argued that there was no “justiciable controversy,” meaning that there was no dispute for the court to resolve— only a precursor to a dispute. The court rejected this argument, finding that there was in fact a dispute the court could resolve. In particular, DJT argued that there was no dispute yet because the Condo Board had not taken any actual steps to remove the Trump signage on the façade. The court disagreed, as both a factual and legal matter. Factually, the court relied heavily on the “Threatening Letter” asserting that removal of the signage would be a material breach of the License Agreement. The court also noted, ironically, that DJT “complains that [the Condo Board] has not taken the very steps [DJT] threatened it and coerced it not to take.” DJT’s legal argument fared no better, as the court held that the judicial interpretation of the License Agreement would (and ultimately did) resolve the dispute. Specifically, if the court found that the License Agreement prevented the Condo Board from removing the signage, then the Condo Board would not remove it and the dispute would be over. Likewise, if the court found that the License Agreement did not prohibit removal, the Condo Board would do so and the dispute would be resolved.

The court then turned to the interpretation of the License Agreement to determine whether removal of the signage was permitted. When the language of a contract is clear, as the court found for the License Agreement, a court must enforce that agreement based on the plain meaning of its terms. When such an agreement is commercial, and negotiated at arm’s length by sophisticated parties—all of which the court found present here—a court is to apply these principles with “even greater force.”

Applying these principles, the court’s straightforward analysis turned on the express language of the “very brief, 4-page (including the signature page) License Agreement.” The court agreed with the Condo Board’s argument that there are “no obligations or requirements for the building to carry the name ‘Trump’ on it in perpetuity.” Specifically, Section 1(a) of the license provides that licensor:

“… hereby grants to Licensee a nonexclusive, non-assignable, nontransferable right, without the right to grant sublicenses, to use the Identifications, on a royalty-free basis, solely for the purpose of identifying the Building at its above-mentioned location and in advertising, promotional and publicity materials solely with respect to the promotion of the Building and its residential condominium units….” (emphasis added by court).

According to the Condo Board, the words “right” and “grant” conferred a permitted right, privilege or favor, not an obligation.

DJT argued in opposition that a “whereas” clause in the agreement was intended to memorialize that the Building would be named Trump Place until such time as a proper vote is conducted in favor of changing the name. The court disagreed with this interpretation of the “whereas” clause, which stated:

“Since approximately March 25, 1999, Licensee has used the Identifications substantially in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and Licensor and Licensee now desire to set forth, in writing, the terms and conditions for Licensee’s continued use of the Identifications to identify the Building.”

The court held this clause merely reflected the parties’ intention to continue use of the Trump name as had been the case since 1999, but did not impose a requirement that use of the Trump name continue forever.

DJT’s next argument — that the Condo Board had not taken the requisite steps to change the name to comply with applicable condominium bylaws — was found to constitute a “fatal” concession. As the court observed, if DJT believed that there was a proper mechanism to vote on removing the Trump name from the building, there must be a right to do so.

The final argument raised by DJT centered on the quality control provision of the License Agreement, which stated: “Licensor shall have the absolute right of prior approval of any and all uses of the identifications of Licensee. Licensee shall submit all such proposed uses to Licensor in writing....” According to DJT, this provision required affirmative consent before any change in use of the Trump name--including a change to non-use — could be made. The court gave this interpretation short shrift, holding that the provision “simply does not say what [DJT] contends it does.” According to the court, “a plain reading of the License Agreement states only that affirmative use of the identifications requires consent.”

The court therefore concluded that the License Agreement was clear and unambiguous and that the Condo Board was not required under the terms of the agreement to use the Trump name on the Building.

So for those of you driving up the West Side Highway, there may only be limited time left to see the Trump Place signage before it comes down. Sad!

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.