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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising, and Beyond

Trademarks

You Can’t Reject My Trademark License—Can You?

May 23, 2018

by Daniel Goldberger and Alessandra Glorioso

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In 2015, we wrote about the District of New Hampshire Bankruptcy Court’s decision in In re Tempnology, LLC.  That decision was significant because it bucked a recent trend in bankruptcy jurisprudence to permit trademark licensees to retain their trademark rights even after debtor trademark licensors reject their licenses under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Despite the trend, the court held that because the Bankruptcy Code did not expressly permit trademark rights to continue post-rejection, as it did expressly for other intellectual property rights, the licensee’s trademark rights were extinguished upon rejection.

Then, in 2017, we wrote about the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) for the First Circuit’s reversal of that decision, keeping with the trend in other circuits to allow trademark rights to continue post-rejection.  In January 2018, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the BAP and reinstated the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, creating a circuit split that the Supreme Court may take up—that is, if Congress doesn’t fix the problem first (which it created and can easily fix).

Under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor has the right to reject executory contracts, meaning that the parties to any rejected contract are relieved of their obligations to perform.  However, Congress included an exception for “intellectual property” licenses in Section 365(n), which allows licensees to continue using the licensed intellectual property through the end of the term of the license even if the debtor rejected that license under Section 365(a). Under the Bankruptcy Code, “intellectual property” is a defined term, which includes both copyrights and patents, but it does not include trademarks.

The circuit split is largely due to a Senate report issued when Section 365(n) was enacted, which stated that trademark rights were intentionally excluded from Section 365(n) because they were different from other intellectual property rights.  As a result, before including trademark rights in Section 365(n), the issue required “more extensive study” and until then, Congress would “allow [for] the development of equitable treatment of this situation by bankruptcy courts.”

In the First Circuit’s Tempnology decision, the court relied heavily on the language of 365(n), the definition of intellectual property, and Congress’s “principal aim in providing for rejection” to support its conclusion that trademark rights do not continue when an executory contract is rejected by the debtor.  The court found that Congress’s “principal aim”—i.e., to “release the debtor from burdensome obligations”—could not be accomplished because of a trademark owner’s obligations to exercise quality control over the mark. Saddling a debtor trademark licensor with those obligations would force it to “choose between performing executory obligations arising from the continuance of the license or risking the permanent loss of its trademarks, thereby diminishing their value to Debtor [or a successor].”

The First Circuit rejected the BAP’s reasoning—which followed the recent trend in other circuits—to allow trademark licensees to continue using their licensed marks based in large part upon the Senate report’s language regarding equitable treatment by the bankruptcy courts.  In particular, the First Circuit accused other circuits, as well as the dissent in this case, of giving far too much weight to the Senate report, especially because the provision at issue contains no ambiguity.  Moreover, the court found that allowing trademark rights to continue post-rejection does not result in equitable treatment; rather, in addition to the burden upon the debtor, it would result in increased uncertainty, inconsistent rulings and hair-splitting, and higher costs on parties.  Given these considerations, the court found in favor of a “categorical approach” of excluding trademark rights from protection under the Bankruptcy Code.

The dissent, to no surprise, disfavored the categorical approach, and instead advocated for equitable treatment, essentially on a case by case basis, consistent with the Senate report.  It argued that the majority’s approach was not only too harsh, but inconsistent with “congressional intent.”

Although the Supreme Court recently extended the time for the trademark licensee from the Tempnology case to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, this is an issue that Congress can (and should) solve quickly and easily.  Section 365(n) was enacted in 1988; 30 years is enough time for “more extensive study.”  And because bankruptcy courts cannot agree on what constitutes equitable treatment—or even whether equitable treatment is entitled—the “let the courts figure it out” approach has not been particularly successful.  To provide clear guidance and an understanding of rights and remedies to trademark licensors, licensees, as well as purchasers of assets or companies in bankruptcy, Congress should decide whether trademark rights continue post-rejection or not. It seems unfair for the fate of a trademark license to be subject to the jurisdiction in which the licensor files for bankruptcy protection.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.